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FACILITATING AUDITING’S NEW EARLY WARNING SYSTEM: 
 
CONTROL DISCLOSURE, AUDITOR LIABILITY AND SAFE HARBORS 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
Abstract 
 
 This Article considers the interplay between new auditing standards governing 
audits of internal control over financial reporting and pre-existing legal standards 
governing auditor liability for audit failure.  The interplay produces skewed liability 
incentives that, if unadjusted, threaten to impair the objective of this new control-audit 
regime. The regime’s objective is, in part, to provide an early warning to financial 
statement users when current financial statements are reliable but control weaknesses 
indicate material risk of a company’s future inability to produce reliable financial 
statements.  To be meaningful, auditor disclosure of material weaknesses and potential 
effects is necessary.   
 
 While liability rules under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 will reinforce 
auditor incentives to provide this disclosure, liability rules under Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will discourage auditors from providing disclosure 
because doing so likely makes them primary actors subject to liability rather than 
secondary actors not subject to liability.  To address this skewed interplay between new 
auditing standards and pre-existing legal liability rules, the Article suggests developing a 
safe harbor system to protect from Section 10(b) liability auditor disclosure of forward-
looking information necessary to give the early warning system meaning.   
 
 The Article gives a comprehensive account of new auditing standards, noting 
interpretive questions, and showing a system entirely dependent on extensive auditor 
disclosure. It then explains how the new system expressly nullifies existing case law 
under Section 11 by substantially expanding required auditor disclosure of internal 
control conclusions and how it probably nullifies existing case law under Section 10(b), 
including the Supreme Court’s landmark 1994 case, Central Bank, that generally 
insulated auditors from Section 10(b) liability. These effects, remarkable on their own, 
pose limits on the early warning system’s promise and the Article suggests using safe 
harbors to overcome them. The Article also offers broader but brief criticism of current 
preoccupation with control effectiveness as the key to reliable financial reporting evident 
in auditing’s otherwise appealing new early warning system. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law & Business, Boston College.  © 2004.  All rights reserved. This paper 
was prepared for presentation at the 17th Bi-Annual University of Kansas School of 
Business/Deloitte-Touche Auditing Conference (April 2004). 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Traditional financial statement auditing begins with an auditor assessing a 
company’s internal control environment—the processes used to promote reliability of a 
company’s financial reporting. Relative control effectiveness dictates the scope of 
substantive testing auditors apply to financial statement assertions. Traditionally, auditing 
standards did not require auditors to disclose to financial statement users the details of 
their control assessment process or its effect on the scope of substantive testing they 
performed.  As a matter of law, this meant that auditors faced no liability to financial 
statement users for failure to disclose control irregularities or those effects.  It also meant, 
when giving an opinion on financial statement assertions, that auditors are secondary 
actors, not liable to financial statement users defrauded through materially misstated 
financial statements. 
 
 The wave of financial statement frauds of the late 1990s and early 2000s exposed 
shortcomings of this traditional approach to auditing and related auditor legal liability.  
Congress responded, in part, by creating a new auditing standard-setter, the Public 
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), and directing it to redefine auditing 
practice to generate auditor disclosure concerning relative control effectiveness. Under 
new standards, auditors must perform an audit of internal control and provide opinions 
for financial statement users.  As a matter of law, this means that auditors now face 
liability for failure to disclose certain control irregularities and their effects on the scope 
of the auditor’s substantive testing.  It also means, when giving such opinions on control, 
that auditors likely become primary actors, exposed to liability to financial statement 
users when their disclosure concerning control effectiveness is materially misstated. 
 
 The theory of this new regime is to provide financial statement users with an early 
warning system.  Control irregularities impair a company’s ability to provide reliable 
financial statements.  Auditors may be able to overcome control irregularities by 
expanded substantive testing and conclude that current financial statements are fair.  But 
those irregularities signal a company’s potential inability to provide fair financial 
statements in the future.  Requiring auditors to disclose current control irregularities, 
despite currently fair financial statements, is intended to provide information to financial 
statement users to enable them to gauge financial statement reliability rather than 
effectively entrusting this to auditor judgment.  This innovative approach to enhanced 
transparency in the financial reporting process holds out promise to promote integrity of 
financial reporting. 
 
 As with many innovations in complex processes, however, auditing’s new early 
warning system presents numerous challenges that must be met in order for it to achieve 
its objectives.  This Article considers challenges arising from the interplay between the 
new early warning system and related legal standards governing auditor liability.  It 
demonstrates that existing legal standards, when applied to this new system, will create 
skewed liability incentives for auditors when determining whether certain control 
irregularities should be disclosed.  In particular, while Section 11 of the Securities Act of 
1933 will encourage auditors to treat close questions as requiring disclosure and facilitate 
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the early warning system, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 will 
encourage auditors to treat close questions as not requiring disclosure and impair the 
early warning system.  Because Section 10(b) applies to a broader range of circumstances 
than Section 11 and carries fewer procedural limits, its effects will be stronger than 
Section 11’s, producing legal incentives that will tend to impair the early warning 
system’s promise.  
 
 To meet this challenge, the Article suggests developing safe harbors for auditor 
disclosure of early warnings concerning control effects on future financial statement 
reliability.  An adjustment such as this seems necessary to relate existing legal doctrines 
to the new auditing standards in a way that will help the new standards achieve their 
objectives.  The approach is defended, in part, by positioning it in the context of broader 
reforms recently undertaken that vest auditing standard-setting and auditor oversight in 
PCAOB rather than the auditing profession and that enhance auditor independence from 
management in the financial reporting process. 
 
 Part I provides a comprehensive account of auditing’s new early warning system.  
It presents the framework for the new exercise of control audits, describes the triggers 
requiring auditors to disclose information concerning control effectiveness, and interprets 
new standards defining the content of this disclosure.  Particular attention is called to a 
key distinction in this system between control irregularities constituting significant 
deficiencies, which auditors need not disclose, and those constituting material 
weaknesses, which auditors must disclose and explain.  Special attention also focuses on 
disclosure content auditors must provide when facing material weaknesses, distinguishing 
between auditor explanation of the effect of weaknesses on the auditor’s substantive 
testing of financial statement assertions and auditor explanation of the potential future 
effects of material weaknesses on financial statements. 
 
 Part II shows the interplay between these new auditing/disclosure standards and 
pre-existing legal standards governing related auditor liability.  It explains that the new 
auditing standards expressly nullify case law under Section 11 that formerly shielded 
auditors from liability for failure to disclose material weaknesses or their consequences.  
The combined effect of the new auditing standards and existing Section 11 jurisprudence 
is to encourage auditor disclosure, including erring in characterizing uncertain control 
irregularities as material weaknesses rather than significant deficiencies, and providing 
related disclosure. 
 
 It then considers how the new auditing standards nullify case law under Section 
10(b) that distinguishes between primary actors who face liability and secondary actors 
who do not.  Auditors providing disclosure under the new auditing standards likely 
become primary rather than secondary actors, while those not providing such disclosure 
remain secondary actors.  The combined effect of the new auditing standards and this 
Section 10(b) jurisprudence is to discourage auditor disclosure, including erring in 
characterizing uncertain control irregularities as significant deficiencies rather than 
material weaknesses, thereby avoiding disclosure. 
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 This Part concludes by explaining how using safe harbors for auditor disclosure 
concerning the potential effects of material weaknesses on future financial statements is  
probably necessary to achieve the early warning system’s objectives.  Safe harbors will 
encourage auditors to err on the side of characterizing uncertain control irregularities as 
material weaknesses and provide detailed disclosure to explain the particular significance 
of discrete material weaknesses rather than treat them as significant deficiencies 
permitting non-disclosure and carrying limited liability risks. 
 
 Part III adopts a broader perspective on auditing’s new early warning system.  
While applauding the system’s goals and main features, it expresses concern that the 
system shows a misguided preoccupation with internal control as the key to producing 
reliable financial reporting.  It illustrates numerous contexts where control can be 
effective but financial misstatements still occur.  The early warning system may be useful 
to warn of future financial misstatements due to weak control, but the new auditing 
standards pay insufficient attention to—and even affirmatively obscure—the possibility 
that effective control may not be adequate to assure reliability of financial reporting.  In 
addition to the new auditing standards creating need for certain legal adjustments, 
therefore, the new auditing standards themselves require additional explanation and 
elaboration in order to develop a coherent and comprehensible system of auditing 
concerning both control and financial statements. 
 
 
I.  PCAOB’S EARLY WARNING SYSTEM 
 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires a company’s management to assess the 
effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting1 and publicly disclose their 
conclusions.2  In turn, SOX requires auditors to attest to managerial assertions and report 
their conclusions publicly as well.3  SOX directs the Public Company Accounting 
                                                 
1 For convenience, the phrase “internal control over financial reporting” is often 
abbreviated in this Article as control. The clunky phrase emerged during SEC regulatory 
development as a way to distinguish this type of control from a wide variety of internal 
controls corporations use to achieve various purposes.  Closely related to internal control 
over financial reporting (in this technical sense) are controls the SEC dubs “disclosure 
controls and procedures.”  The term is intended to define a somewhat overlapping variety 
of mechanisms that may be beyond the scope of an auditor’s testing, evaluation and 
opinion. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MANAGEMENT’S REPORTS ON 
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION IN EXCHANGE ACT 
PERIODIC REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8238 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter SEC, 
MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL]. 
 
2 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404(a), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. 
____; see SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note 1. 
 
3  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404(b), Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 
U.S.C. ____. 
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Oversight Board (PCAOB) to establish auditing standards for this exercise.4  PCAOB 
does so in Auditing Standard No. 2.5 
 
A. Framework 
 
 In promulgating Auditing Standard No. 2, PCAOB made several major decisions 
reflecting an ambitious vision for its new audit system for internal control over financial 
reporting. They add up to this: the auditor’s engagement is a full-fledged audit of control, 
requiring the auditor’s opinion specifically on control effectiveness, with any material 
weakness compelling the auditor to issue an adverse opinion.6 
 
 This model’s strength is seen by comparing its alternative, which PCAOB 
rejected: the engagement could have been a review of control, calling for the auditor’s 
opinion only on managerial assertions concerning control effectiveness, with material 
weaknesses calling for the auditor to determine whether to issue an adverse opinion or 
various forms of qualified opinions.   The following explains each choice, showing that 
Auditing Standard No. 2 is strong brew, not weak tea. 
 
 1.  Audit of Control — Auditing Standard No. 2 denominates the auditing 
engagement concerning control as an audit, not merely a review or other limited exercise.  
PCAOB solicited public comment as to whether the engagement should be denominated 
as an audit.  Numerous commentators opined that it would be more accurate to describe it 
as an attestation exercise, suggesting lower levels of work and assurance.7 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
4  Id., § 103(a)(2)(A) (calling for auditor opinion on control effectiveness) & § 404(b) 
(calling for auditor opinion on management’s assertions concerning control 
effectiveness). 
 
5 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), AUDITING STANDARD 
NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN 
CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (March 9, 2004) [hereinafter 
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2].  [Note: This is subject to SEC approval, expected easily 
given SEC’s substantial role in the preparation process.] 
 
6  AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 59 & 140.   Auditing Standard No. 2’s definition of 
material weakness is excerpted in footnote 15 below. 
 
7  E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Prof. McAllister (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket 
No. 8, Letter No. 36) (describing using audit designation as potentially problematic and 
confusing); Arnall Golden Gregory (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 57) 
(review of internal control concerns risk of future financial misstatements, entailing lower 
level of assurance compared to financial statement audit); Texas Society of Certified 
Public Accountants (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 78) (audit involves 
testing whereas an attestation involves review); Fédération des Experts Comptables 
Européens (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 79) (noting inconsistency with 
international standards that distinguish between assurance and audit); Institute of 
 6
 
 PCAOB opined that the concepts of audit and attestation describe engagements of 
equivalent scope.  Despite acknowledging that many treat the concepts as involving 
different levels of work and assurance, PCAOB emphasized the technical equivalence of 
the exercises.8  Even so, PCAOB defended its choice to call the engagement an audit on 
the grounds that attestation is insufficient to describe the elaborate exercise Auditing 
Standard No. 2 prescribes.9 
 
 2.  Direct Opinion on Control — Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to 
deliver two control-related opinions: one opinion on management’s assertions concerning 
control effectiveness and a separate opinion on the auditor’s own assessment of whether a 
company maintained effective internal control over financial reporting.10  The separate 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 102) (opining that SOX Section 404(b) refers to an attestation or report so 
denominating it an audit goes beyond mandate and “substantially alter[s] the risk profile 
of the audit profession”); Cummins (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 123) 
(“intent should be to validate the adequacy of management’s process and not to re-
perform the assessment.”); Caterpillar Corp. (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 143) (contending that denominating the exercise as an audit exceeds SOX’s 
mandate).   
 
 Other commentators supported denominating the exercise as an audit, including 
the AICPA, the Big Four auditing firms, and the mid-sized auditing firms.  See Comment 
Letters to PCAOB from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 105); Deloitte & Touche LLP (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71); Ernst & Young LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144); KPMG LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 91); PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 
82). BDO Seidman, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136); Grant 
Thornton LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 101); McGladrey & 
Pullen, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 142).  
 
8 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 18 (“There is no difference in the level of work 
performed or assurance obtained by the auditor when expressing an opinion on 
management’s assessment of effectiveness or when expressing an opinion directly on the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting”); see also PCAOB RELEASE 
ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 7 (it is “erroneous” to distinguish 
between attestation and audit; both require same level of work). 
 
9 PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 6.  Even PCAOB, 
therefore, implicitly recognized some differences in the engagements described as audit 
versus attestation and clearly emphasizes that the new regime involves a complete rather 
than partial evaluation. 
 
10 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 167.  The two opinions can be presented in a single 
report or in separate reports.  Id. 
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opinion on control involves auditors more directly in the disclosure process.  That is, if 
their opinion concerned only management’s assertions, auditors could concur or dissent, 
forcing all detailed disclosure obligations on management.  By requiring a separate direct 
opinion, auditors cannot hide behind management’s statements.  They must furnish their 
own disclosure. 
 
 PCAOB made this decision based on comments received on its proposed 
standard.  It asked whether the audit report should speak directly to control rather than 
merely to management’s assertions.11 Its original model proposed an auditor opinion on 
management’s assertions when this was unqualified and an opinion directly on control 
otherwise.  Auditing Standard No. 2 adopts instead the two-opinion approach, which 
PCAOB explained was necessary to provide greater clarity of disclosure to investors and 
avoid confusion.12  PCOAB also opined that this approach is more consistent with SOX 
Section 404, calling for an opinion on management’s assertions, and SOX Section 103, 
calling for an auditor opinion on control.13  
 
 The result is that auditors now provide a total of three opinions: one opinion on 
the financial statements and two opinions concerning control.14  The three-opinion 
arrangement poses the possibility of many different combinations of opinions. These 
include the polar cases of unqualified opinions on all and adverse opinions on all as well 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
11  PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD (PCAOB), A PROPOSED 
STANDARD CONCERNING AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING 
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Oct. 2003) 
[hereinafter PCAOB, PROPOSED STANDARD], Question. 27. 
 
12 See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, App. E, ¶¶ E27-E28 (approach makes reports easier 
for users to understand); PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, 
at 22-23 (control opinions on management’s assessment and on control effectiveness 
“most clearly communicate[s] to readers the nature and results of the work). 
 
13 See PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 22-23 (requiring 
auditor opinions on management’s control assessment and on control effectiveness most 
closely tracks requirements of SOX Sections 103 and 404). The argument runs as 
follows: SOX Section 404 requires management assessment of control with an auditor 
attestation; Section 103 directs PCAOB to adopt standards requiring auditors to report on 
management’s Section 404 assertions and to present their findings and evaluation of 
controls.  
 
14 PCAOB’s multiple-opinion decision appears inspired, at least in part, by a comment 
letter from the German auditing profession. See Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institut 
der Wirtschaftsprüfer (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 63) (opining that 
SOX requires three opinions: on the financial statements, on management’s control 
assessment, and on control directly). 
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as any combination of adverse or qualified opinions, plus opinions bearing scope 
limitations or accompanied by disclaimers of opinion.  
 
 3. No Qualified Control Opinion Option — The key concept in evaluating the 
effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting is material weakness.  PCAOB 
defines this as control deficiencies resulting in more-than-a-remote likelihood of material 
misstatements in financial reports.15  Under Auditing Standard No. 2, the presence of a 
material weakness requires auditors to deliver an adverse control opinion, without the 
option of providing a qualified (“except for”) opinion.16  In traditional financial-statement 
auditing, “except for” opinions are used to convey an intermediate level of assurance.17    
 
 Concerning the new control auditing system, an interpretive issue in the financial 
reporting community appeared to be whether management’s assessments of internal 
control effectiveness must be adverse when controls are ineffective in any way or 
whether management could give a qualified assessment—that control is effective “except 
for” designated disclosed areas.  SEC regulations prescribing requirements for 
management’s assertions about control effectiveness prohibit management from 
                                                 
15  Auditing Standard No. 2 defines material weakness as follows: 
 
 A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of 
significant deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a 
material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. 
 
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 10.  In turn, Auditing Standard No. 2 defines significant 
deficiency as follows: 
 
 A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of 
control deficiencies, that adversely affects the company’s ability to 
initiate, authorize, record, process or report external financial data reliably 
in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles such that 
there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the 
company’s annual or interim financial statements that is more than 
inconsequential will not be prevented or detected. 
 
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 9. 
 
16 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 173(b) & 175. 
 
17  See VINCENT M. O’REILLY, ET AL., MONTGOMERY’S AUDITING (12th ed. 1998), at 28-
23 
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concluding control is effective when a material weakness exists.18  Some interpreted this 
to permit management to give a qualified opinion.19   
 
 PCAOB rejected this interpretation and requires the audit model to follow suit.20  
Accordingly, when a material weakness is identified, auditors must give an adverse 
                                                 
18 See SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note 1. 
 
19  Most commentators on PCAOB’s proposed standard opined that its control-audit 
model should follow the SEC’s model for management’s control-assessment.  
Commentators split in interpreting the SEC’s management model. The SEC directs that 
identified material weaknesses prevent management from concluding that control is 
effective. The issue was whether this meant management could offer a qualified opinion.  
Support for this view appeared in the SEC’s approving citation to AT 501, which permits 
qualified opinions. See SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note 1, at Part 
II.B.3, n. 72 (approvingly citing AT § 501, ¶ 37).  E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 68) (recommending that management should disclose nature of weaknesses 
and corrective actions taken but that auditor should use judgment concerning what 
opinion to give); National State Auditors Association (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 
8, Letter No. 113) (agreeing that audit model should follow management model and 
concluding that since management cannot give qualified conclusions nor can auditor 
provide qualified opinions); American Society of Corporate Secretaries, PCAOB Sub-
Committee of the ASCS Securities Law Committee (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 106) (recommending allowing auditor to use professional judgment as to 
whether control opinion should be qualified rather than adverse based on materiality of 
weakness and any scope limitations); American Bar Association, Section of Business Law 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 185) (qualified opinion “can be useful to 
convey information to stockholders that would otherwise not be conveyed by a blanket 
adverse opinion”). 
 
 The Big Four and mid-sized accounting firms offered split opinions.  Opponents 
of mandatory adverse opinions were Deloitte & Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst 
& Young, BDO Seidman and McGladrey & Pullen.  See Comment Letters to PCAOB 
from Deloitte & Touche LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71); Ernst 
& Young LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144); 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 82); BDO 
Seidman, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136); McGladrey & 
Pullen, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 142). Supporting mandatory 
adverse opinions were KPMG and Grant Thornton. See Comment Letters to PCOAB from 
KPMG LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 91); Grant Thornton LLP 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 101).  Some others supported the 
mandatory adverse opinion as well. E.g., American Accounting Association (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 31); National State Auditors Association (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 113). 
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opinion on control effectiveness.21  Auditing Standard No. 2 thus departs from traditional 
financial-statement auditing conventions by prohibiting the intermediate level of 
assurance signaled by “except for” opinions.22    
 
 The effect of PCAOB’s framework in Auditing Standard No. 2—requiring full 
control audits with direct control opinions and without the except-for option—is to render 
auditors as detectors of control weaknesses in the fullest possible way.  This ambitious 
and rigid framework is designed to generate warnings to financial statement users 
concerning the reliability of financial statements prepared at companies possessing 
“leaky” internal control over financial reporting.  This early warning system is at the 
heart of Auditing Standard No. 2, which contains specific triggers requiring auditors to 
provide such warnings. 
 
B.  Triggers 
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 states: “[i]nformation on internal control over financial 
reporting is intended to provide an early warning to those inside and outside the company 
who are in a position to insist on improvements . . . .”23  Those outside the company 
include investors as well as all gatekeepers.24  The pressure arises because the early 
warning system is a signal concerning risks of unreliability of a company’s financial 
statements, both current and future.   
 
 1.  Reports Requiring Auditor Disclosure — When auditors concur with 
management’s assessment that control is effective and opine separately that the company 
maintained effective control, Auditing Standard No. 2 does not specifically require 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, App. E, ¶¶ E108-E114 (noting that PCAOB’s rejection 
of this interpretation is based on conversations with SEC staff concerning its 
interpretation of SEC regulations governing management’s conclusions). 
 
21 See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, App. E, ¶¶ E108-E114. An exception applies for 
circumstances where an overall opinion cannot be expressed due to scope limitations, but 
then Auditing Standard No. 2 requires the auditor to explain why.  PCAOB RELEASE 
ACCOMPANYING AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at 22 (citing SEC Regulation S-X, Item 2-
02(f), that if auditor cannot provide overall attestation opinion, auditor must explain 
why). 
 
22 E.g., O’REILLY, MONTGOMERY’S AUDITING, supra note 17, at 28-23. 
 
23 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 6. 
 
24 Gatekeepers are “securities professionals,” defined as “accountants, public accounting 
firms, investment bankers, investment advisors, brokers, dealers, attorneys, and other 
securities professionals.” Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 703, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 
Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. § 7201. 
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auditors to provide any additional description.25  However, Auditing Standard No. 2 
specifically requires auditors to issue modified reports containing tailored disclosure in 
numerous circumstances, including the following. 
 
 First, auditors must issue an adverse report on control when a material weakness 
is identified. Audit reports must state PCAOB’s definition of the concept of material 
weakness (essentially a more-than-remote risk of material financial misstatements)26 and 
identify its existence.  More importantly, the auditor’s report must describe the material 
weakness to provide the report’s users “specific information about [its] nature” and “its 
actual or potential effect on the presentation of the company’s financial statements issued 
during [its] existence . . . .”27   
 
 Second, auditors must issue modified reports when “management’s assessment is 
inadequate.”28  In such cases, auditors must indicate a scope limitation on their report, 
indicating lack of adequate review.29  In addition, auditors must issue modified reports 
when “management’s report is inappropriate.”30  In these cases, auditors must “include, at 
a minimum, an explanatory paragraph describing the reasons for this conclusion.”31 
                                                 
25 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at A-92, Example A-1. 
 
26 Auditing Standard No. 2’s definition of material weakness is excerpted in footnote 15 
above. 
 
27 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 176 (emphasis added).  This description is also to 
address requirements described in AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 194, noted in the 
ensuing text.  The standard nods at the ridiculous in the following additional requirement: 
if management makes an adverse assessment of its internal control over financial 
reporting (and, implicitly, the auditor concurs), then auditors would provide an 
unqualified opinion as to management’s assessment.  Id., ¶ 176. Absent some additional 
auditor role, when management says its company did not maintain effective internal 
control over financial reporting, users do not need an auditor to attest to this assertion. 
Including this requirement only makes sense if the auditor is directly charged with 
explaining the weakness and providing detailed descriptions as to its actual and potential 
effect on the financial statements. This appears to be PCAOB”s intention.  See infra Part 
I.C. 
 
28 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 173(a).   
 
29 Id., ¶ 174. 
 
30 Id., ¶ 173(a).  
 
31 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 174. If there is material weakness, management may not 
conclude control is effective and must disclose all material weaknesses. Although 
management’s report can take many forms, it must “state a direct conclusion about 
whether the company’s [control] is effective.” Id., ¶ 163.  An auditor’s evaluation of 
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 Third, modifications to auditors’ control reports are necessary when material 
weaknesses exist that nevertheless do not prevent giving an unqualified opinion on 
financial statements.32  A control opinion “might describe a material weakness . . . while 
the audit report on the financial statements remains unqualified.”33  If so, control reports 
are to include, in the paragraph describing material weaknesses, language to the effect 
that the auditor considered the material weakness in planning substantive audit tests of 
financial statement assertions and that the adverse control report did not affect the 
financial statement audit report.34  
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 explains: “such disclosure is important to ensure that 
users of the auditor’s report on the financial statements understand why the auditor issued 
an unqualified opinion on those statements.”35  In addition: “Disclosure is also important 
when the auditor’s opinion on the financial statements is affected by the adverse opinion 
on the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting.”36  In this case, Auditing 
Standard No. 2 directs that the auditor’s control report include similar language but 
without the statement that it did not affect the financial statement audit report.37 
 
 These triggers requiring auditors to provide disclosure concerning internal control 
effectiveness reflect the theory that effective internal control is an important element in 
assuring reliable financial statements.  Control weaknesses threaten a company’s ability 
to produce reliable financial statements.  Investors need to know this, even when a 
company’s current financial statements are deemed reliable.  The auditor’s audit and 
opinion, including automatic adverse opinions when material weaknesses exist, are 
designed to communicate warnings to financial statement users.38 
                                                                                                                                                 
management’s report must include an assessment of whether it properly discloses 
material weaknesses (including those corrected during the period covered).  Id., ¶ 166. 
 
32 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 193. 
 
33 Id., ¶ 194. 
 
34 Id., ¶ 195. 
 
35  Id. 
 
36 Id., ¶ 196. 
 
37 Id. 
 
38 Several other circumstances also require modified opinions that communicate warnings 
to financial statement users. Auditors must issue a modified report to disclose any 
restriction on the engagement’s scope. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 176(c).  In this 
case, auditors can only give unqualified opinions on management’s assessment and on 
internal control over financial reporting if they were able to apply all necessary 
procedures.  Id., ¶ 178. Otherwise, auditors should withdraw from the engagement, 
disclaim giving any opinion, or provide a qualified opinion. The choice depends on the 
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 2.  Incongruent Opinions — The salient early warning occurs when an auditor 
issues an adverse opinion on control effectiveness while providing an unqualified opinion 
that the financial statements fairly present results and condition in conformity with 
GAAP.39 This seeming incongruity is possible because a material weakness discovered in 
control can be overcome in a financial statement audit by substantive tests that do not 
rely upon the controls bearing the material weakness.  
 
 The key effect of such incongruent opinions as the central element of PCOAB’s 
new early warning system is to enhance transparency of the interior processes of financial 
reporting, control and audit.  This central role is reflected in PCAOB’s response to public 
comment it sought as to whether there are “circumstances where a qualified ‘except for’ 
conclusion [in a control audit] would be appropriate” as an alternative to expressing an 
adverse control-audit opinion when a material weakness exists.40  Commentators 
suggested numerous possible circumstances.   
 
 The most common suggestion was to permit qualified opinions when a material 
weakness in control did not prevent giving an unqualified opinion on the financial 
statements.41  Some commentators recommended that this should be the case at least 
                                                                                                                                                 
importance of omitted procedures, but if restrictions are management-imposed then either 
withdrawing or disclaiming both opinions is required.  For example, suppose 
management found weaknesses and corrected them in a way it believes rendered control 
effective, but the auditor disagrees that enough time has elapsed to be confident.  This 
would warrant a scope limitation.  Id., ¶ 179. If, in this context, the auditor’s partial 
procedures identified a material weakness, then the auditor must provide disclosure along 
the lines discussed in the foregoing text.   
 
 Auditors also must issue modified reports when management includes certain 
disclosure in its report in addition to its conclusions on whether control is effective. 
AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 176(f). Examples include information concerning 
corrective actions, plans to implement new controls, and cost-benefit decisions not to do 
so. Id., ¶ 190. In this case, auditors must disclaim giving an opinion on the additional 
information, id., ¶ 191, and, if it contains material misstatements of fact, discuss this with 
management, possibly report it to the company’s audit committee, and perhaps even 
consult its own counsel concerning further obligations the auditor may have under 
Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act. Id., ¶ 192. Auditing Standard No. 2 notes 
that if management includes such information elsewhere in its securities filing, then no 
disclaimer is required though the same steps apply. Id. 
 
39   AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 193-196. 
 
40  PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD, Question 26. 
 
41 E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Credit Suisse (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 
8, Letter No. 74) (excerpt-for opinion “especially in the absence of material 
misstatements to the financial statements.”); Southern Union (PCAOB Rulemaking 
 14
absent errors or irregularities in the financial statements and the material weakness in 
control was otherwise isolated.42  PCAOB rejected these suggestions on the theory that 
control audits are designed to provide assurance of system capacity to prevent future 
financial misstatements.  An exception for circumstances where current financial 
statements are unaffected would diminish the utility of the device as an early warning 
system.43  
 
 3.  Material Weaknesses —The key concept in evaluating control effectiveness,   
material weakness, is closely related to the concept of significant deficiency.44  Material 
weakness in control is a particularly severe form of significant deficiency.   At bottom, 
the difference concerns gravity: significant deficiencies pose consequential risks for 
financial statement reliability while material weaknesses pose material risks. The 
characterization has significant implications: auditors must disclose and explain material 
weaknesses publicly, but need only bring significant deficiencies to the attention of 
management and audit committees.45 
 
 Distinguishing significant deficiencies from material weaknesses requires 
judgment.  Whether a significant deficiency amounts to a material weakness depends on 
the possibility that a financial misstatement could result (not on whether it has—this is 
                                                                                                                                                 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 98) (adverse opinion only if material weakness “could impact 
financials”). 
 
42 E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Arnall Golden Gregory (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 57) (suggesting allowing qualified opinions when material 
weakness is isolated and “no errors or irregularities” appear in the financial statements). 
 
43 In fact, PCOAB’s rejection of these comments suggest either material weakness in 
control always prevents giving an unqualified financial statement opinion in future 
periods or that investors rather than auditors should judge the risk of this eventuality.  
That is, Auditing Standard No. 2 designs an early warning system intended to empower 
“those inside and outside the company who are in a position to insist on improvements in 
internal control over financial reporting.” AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 6.  See infra Part 
III. 
 
44 Auditing Standard No. 2’s definitions of material weakness and significant deficiency 
are provided above in footnote 15. 
 
45  Compare AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 207-214 (required communications to 
management, audit committees and boards of directors include all significant deficiencies 
and material weaknesses) with AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 173(a) & 175-177 
(required modifications to audit reports when there is a material weakness). 
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the essence of the early warning system).46  This depends on both the likelihood and 
magnitude, measured using various factors.47  
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 defines material weakness using general terms.  This 
breadth captures a wide range of circumstances. These run from inadequate articulation 
of company policy to noncompliance with it.  A material weakness can be a serious 
infection at a single business segment or involve a single significant account company-
wide.  Weaknesses can result from changes in applicable GAAP or associated accounting 
policies or from acquisitions of companies that, in turn, suffered from weak internal 
control over financial reporting.48   
 
 Furthermore, a company can be in various stages of addressing any material 
weakness.  Discovery can arise from a variety of sources, including through internal audit 
or during an external audit.  Curative steps may operate effectively within a short period 
of time (say dismissing a rogue noncompliant employee) or may take multiple accounting 
periods (retraining the entire finance or accounting department in proper accounting or 
control).   
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 thus contemplates a wide variety of circumstances 
requiring auditors to provide explanatory paragraphs in reports.  While PCAOB suggests 
disclosure parameters and provides some specific disclosure requirements, its specific 
prescriptions include ambiguities and its general directives are deliberately left open-
ended as to exactly what disclosure auditors must provide in various circumstances as 
warnings to financial statement users. 
 
C.  Content 
  
 Required auditor disclosure can usefully be divided into two categories. The first 
concerns the level of detail auditors must provide to explain their conclusions.  This 
chiefly relates to the auditor’s explanations concerning identified material weaknesses 
and their effects on financial statements, as well as why they regard management 
assertions as inadequate or inappropriate. The second concerns the scope of disclosure 
auditors must provide to explain the effect of their conclusions on their overall work.  
                                                 
46 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 132 (“The significance of a deficiency in [control] 
depends on the potential for a misstatement, not on whether a misstatement actually has 
occurred.”). 
 
47  See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 133 (illustrating factors affecting the likelihood that 
a deficiency “could result in a misstatement”); id., ¶ 134 (illustrating factors affecting 
magnitude). 
 
48 Auditing Standard No. 2 expressly recognizes a scope limitation when material 
weaknesses arise from year-end acquisitions.  This scope limitation is also available 
generally for limitations beyond management control.  See supra note 38. 
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This chiefly relates to how discovered control deficiencies or weaknesses influenced the 
scope of the auditor’s substantive testing in performing its financial statement audit. 
 
 1.  Auditor Conclusions —  Auditing Standard No. 2 makes clear what auditors 
must do when facing material weaknesses.  They must give an adverse opinion on 
control, identify the weakness and provide Auditing Standard No. 2’s definition of the 
concept.  It is somewhat less clear concerning exactly what auditors must explain about 
the consequences of material weaknesses in particular cases.  
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 expressly requires auditors to disclose “specific 
information about the nature of any material weakness, and its actual or potential effect 
on the presentation of the company’s financial statements issued during the existence of 
the weakness.”49  This is an extraordinary statement, requiring auditors to provide 
forward-looking information concerning potential effects of control weaknesses on future 
financial statements.  
 
 On the other hand, PCAOB provides seemingly different prescriptions in forms of 
auditor opinions accompanying Auditing Standard No. 2.  In giving an adverse opinion 
on control effectiveness, these forms of opinion direct auditors to “[i]nclude a description 
of the material weakness and its effect on the achievement of the objectives of the control 
criteria.”50   The auditor’s conclusion is to state that “because of the effect of the material 
weakness . . . on the achievement of the objectives of the control criteria, [the company] 
has not maintained effective internal control over financial reporting. . . .”51 
 
 It is possible to reconcile these seemingly different propositions of disclosure 
concerning actual or potential financial statement effects on the one hand and disclosure 
concerning effects on achieving control objectives on the other.  Control criteria 
objectives relate ultimately to effects on financial statements.  When Auditing Standard 
No. 2 directs that auditors disclose specific information concerning actual or potential 
effects of control weaknesses on financial statements, this can be seen as the equivalent 
of requiring description of the weakness’ effects on control objectives.   
 
 While this reconciliation seems reasonable, the two different prescriptions create 
an ambiguity.  Clarifying it will require auditors to provide detailed disclosure as to how 
                                                 
49 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 176 (emphasis added).  This description is also to 
address requirements described in Auditing Standard No. 2, ¶ 194, noted above. 
 
50  AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, at A-96, Example A-2. 
 
51   Id.  PCAOB’s examples further instruct auditors to state that this weakness was 
considered in planning the financial statement audit and to state whether it affected the 
resulting financial statement opinion, and when it does, PCAOB’s examples direct 
attention to the requirements of AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 194-196, discussed above 
in Part I.B.1. 
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the two propositions relate to each other.  Summary or boilerplate statements will not 
provide requisite information to financial statement users. 
 
 In addition to this ambiguity that should compel auditors to disclose significant 
detail, PCAOB’s general framework for Auditing Standard No. 2 seems to contemplate 
extensive auditor disclosure. Detailed auditor disclosure is implied by denominating the 
exercise an audit, requiring auditor opinions directly on control and, most importantly, 
mandating adverse opinions when facing material weaknesses. 
 
 First, though PCAOB denies any particular significance to denominating Auditing 
Standard No. 2’s control exercise as an audit rather than an attestation, a subtle but 
important consequence of the audit conception is to designate an exercise of equivalent 
significance to the financial statement audit.  This gives control equal stature with 
financial statements.  Experience with traditional financial statement auditing suggests 
that making this audit exercise understandable to investors will require education by 
elaborate disclosure.52 
 
 Second, requiring separate auditor opinions on control effectiveness creates need 
for greater disclosure.  This is particularly so given the possibility of multiple 
combinations of the three audit opinions.  To avoid investor confusion, auditors will have 
to provide substantial explanatory disclosure.  This would certainly be the case when 
different sorts of opinions are given, whenever an adverse or other non-standard opinion 
is given, and even when opinions are unqualified.  Otherwise, investors will be misled 
concerning the relationship between effective internal control and reliable financial 
statements.53 
 
                                                 
52 To take a single, striking, example, between 1932 and 1934, the American Institute of 
Accounts (successor to the American Association of Public Accountants founded in 1887 
and predecessor to the AICPA founded in 1957) engaged in wide-ranging discussion with 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) concerning the auditing profession’s 
responsibilities. Discussion considered whether a disclaimer in the standard audit report 
stating that auditors do not perform a comprehensive examination would help the public 
understand the nature of the audit process; the general consensus was that such a 
statement probably would not mean much.  See GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS 
MERINO, A HISTORY OF ACCOUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (1998). By the late 1980s, this consensus changed.  Studies 
indicated widespread public misapprehension about auditing.  As a result, the standard 
audit report was changed effective in 1989, adding specific sentences to clarify that 
financial statement audits involve examination, on a test basis, and that financial statements 
are prepared by and are the responsibility of management.  See LAWRENCE A. 
CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4h 
ed. 2004). 
 
53  This point is elaborated more fully in Part III. 
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 Third, mandatory adverse opinions when facing material weaknesses deprive 
auditors of a standardized signal indicating gradations in severity.  Permitting qualified 
opinions with accompanying explanation is the general approach to financial statement 
audits.  In the case of control audits, PCAOB could have defined in Auditing Standard 
No. 2 a separate category for material weaknesses that are not pervasive and prescribed 
issuing qualified opinions in these circumstances.  Absent a qualified-opinion option, 
however, the communication otherwise signaled must be provided by narrative.54 
 
 In traditional financial statement audits, adverse opinions are a significant 
penalty.55  Taken at face value, adverse control opinions could pose consequences 
disproportionate to the significance of any given material weakness.  At the extreme, it 
could shut off a company’s access to capital.  Of course, some material weaknesses 
justify exactly that.  To the extent that this result is unjustified in a particular case, it 
indicates need for detailed specificity in accompanying auditor disclosure.  
 
 Adverse opinions that reasonable investors would understand to justify a severe 
reaction (such as withholding capital investment) would be misleading without specific 
detail indicating that the defects are not pervasive.56  Some commentators opining on 
PCAOB’s proposed standard opposed permitting qualified opinions on the grounds that 
allowing them would require auditors to evaluate the severity of material weakness, 
leading to more classifications.57  This result is exactly what Auditing Standard No. 2 
contemplates, with the classifications defined by particular auditor disclosure not abstract 
categories. 
 
 Detailed disclosure is likewise necessary to avoid otherwise dilutive effects that 
mandatory adverse opinions can produce.58   The more adverse opinions that are issued, 
                                                 
54 See Comment Letters to PCAOB from Deloitte & Touche LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71) (opining that mandatory adverse opinion for material 
weakness is inappropriate if weakness is “not pervasive”); PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 82) (opining that mandatory adverse 
opinion for material weakness is “too restrictive” and inappropriate if weakness presents 
an “isolated impact” as opposed to a “pervasive impact”). 
 
55  E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68). 
 
56 E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 105). 
 
57  Comment Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket 
No. 8, Letter No. 136). 
 
58 E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No.136) (“excessive use of the adverse opinion . . .  will lessen the 
potential message . . . [The] adverse opinion should provide a signal of the magnitude of 
a pervasive weakness”). 
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the less information content any particular adverse opinion carries.59  To make these 
reports meaningful and not misleading, auditors will have to provide particularized 
disclosure explaining the consequences of a material weakness in specific contexts. 
 
 PCAOB signals its intention to require explanations by concluding that its audit 
model must follow the management model, ordained by the SEC.  There is no compelling 
logical reason why the audit model must follow the management model, though it may be 
less confusing. One difference is that while management cannot give its qualified opinion 
and explanation in its control report it can do so elsewhere in its disclosure filings, such 
as in the MD&A.  Auditors lack such alternative outlets.  Under Auditing Standard No. 2, 
PCAOB is saying they must provide this disclosure in their control-audit reports. 
 
 2.  Auditor Processes — Auditing Standard No. 2 notes that an auditor’s control 
opinion “might describe a material weakness . . . while the audit report on the financial 
statements remains unqualified.”60  If so, Auditing Standard No. 2 requires reports to 
include, in the paragraph describing material weaknesses, language indicating that the 
auditor considered the material weakness in planning substantive financial audit tests and 
that the adverse control report did not affect its financial statement audit report.61 
 
 It is doubtful whether such a simple statement will provide financial statement 
users with sufficient information to satisfy obligations that disclosure not mislead.  
Auditing Standard No. 2 does not literally appear to require disclosure of the auditor’s 
processes or assessments during the control audit (or the financial statement audit).  But 
since the value of providing an adverse control opinion despite an unqualified financial 
statement opinion is alerting investors to risk of future financial statement unreliability, 
logic and completeness indicate that the auditor fully disclose such risk and related 
processes and assessments. 
 
 The reason this incongruent opinion is possible, after all, is that weak controls 
discovered in a control audit can be compensated for by substantive testing in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
59 E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 82) (“Except for” opinion would be “more useful 
to readers”); Ernst & Young LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144) 
(supporting qualified opinion option based on assessment of material weakness that 
“would more clearly communicate to users” and be more meaningful to investors);  
Edison Electric Institute (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 117) (supporting 
option to offer qualified opinions as more useful for investors and that  automatic adverse 
opinions would “create confusion” and “be misleading to investors” because they do “not 
provide the ability to adequately communicate to the investing public the actual impact of 
the weakness to the company.”). 
 
60 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 194. 
 
61 Id., ¶ 195. 
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financial statement audit.  Auditors will need to explain this process in some detail to 
enable investors to understand it.  Investors need auditors to explain why, if current 
financial statement reliability can be vouched for, the auditor also concludes that control 
is ineffective. Investors will need to know why the financial reporting process cannot 
simply rely upon auditor testing.  Absent explanations of this sort, PCAOB’s 
contemplated early warning system will lack meaningful warnings. 
 
 By deepening transparency into the interior of the financing reporting process, 
PCAOB’s new early warning system reflects a view that investors rather than auditors 
should be the ultimate judges. To achieve this level of informed investors, auditors must 
provide detailed information as to their methodology. The fundamental argument for 
meaningful detail is the significant stress and confidence placed on control as the key to 
fair financial reporting and the decision in SOX and Auditing Standard No. 2 to make this 
reporting process public.62   
 
 Finally, since an auditor associates itself with management assertions on control 
effectiveness, users reasonably will expect auditors to have tested control fully and to 
explain their testing processes along with their conclusions.  Otherwise, an expectations 
gap arises between what investors believe auditor assurance means and what assurance 
auditors in fact provide.  The potential for an expectations gap raises issues concerning 
auditor liability.  This interplay between Auditing Standard No. 2 and existing auditor 
liability rules is awkward, suggesting need to adjust related legal standards to make the 
new early warning system meaningful. 
 
 
II. AUDITOR LIABILITY AND CONFLICTING LEGAL INCENTIVES 
 
 The early warning system exposes auditors to new liability risks, and PCAOB 
apparently intends liability risks to promote the system’s effectiveness.63  Whether it will 
is doubtful, without adjustments to legal rules corresponding to PCAOB’s changes in 
professional auditing standards. 
 
 Auditors are subject to civil liability when their work fails to satisfy applicable 
legal requirements.64  Applicable legal requirements generally derive from relevant 
                                                 
62 Cf. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, App. E, ¶ E18 (testing internal control over financial 
reporting “takes on added importance with the public nature of the internal control 
reporting”).  See infra Part III. 
 
63  Under federal securities law, the SEC cannot promulgate rules extending beyond a 
statute’s scope.  Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976).  However, 
this restriction does not limit PCAOB in establishing GAAS that imposes obligations on 
auditors that form the basis of legal standards of negligence, recklessness or fraud. 
 
64 Auditors are also subject to criminal liability but this topic is beyond the scope of this 
Article.  Criminal liability for auditors can be based on a variety of mostly federal 
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auditing standards.  Numerous federal securities law sections address various wrongs.65  
Principal laws are Section 11 under the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and Section 
10(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).66  The statutes and 
associated remedies are generally construed cumulatively.67  So, for example, a Section 
10(b) claim exists even if a Section 11 claim also exists.68   
                                                                                                                                                 
statutes.  In addition to the federal securities laws, these include the False Statements 
Statute, the Mail Fraud Statute, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act.  Compared to the substantial number of civil cases against auditors, there are 
relatively few criminal cases against them (though when the latter are brought, the 
consequences are usually more devastating). Still, Auditing Standard No. 2 may provide 
additional theories of criminal liability.  
 
65 State common law also imposes on auditors the standard of care found in traditional 
tort law applicable to professionals, the breach of which gives rise to claims for ordinary 
negligence.  Gross negligence involves reckless departures from generally accepted 
auditing standards (GAAS).  Auditing engagements routinely are conducted pursuant to a 
written agreement that can form the basis for state-law breach of contract claims.   These 
topics, including issues relating to which third-parties have standing to bring such claims, 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 
66  Others include Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, which creates private rights of action 
against persons, including accountants, who “make or cause to be made” materially 
misleading statements in reports or other documents filed with the SEC.  15 U.S.C. § 78r;   
see Ernst & Ernst Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (“Liability extends to persons who, in 
reliance on such statements, purchased or sold a security whose price was affected by the 
statements”). Auditors defend such claims by showing good faith and lack of knowledge.  
See id.  (defendants are “accorded the defense that [they] acted in ‘good faith’ and had no 
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading”). Another liability ground is 
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and 
disclosure, the interpretation of which was deferred by the Supreme Court in Ernst & 
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 557 n. 9 
(1979); and Herman & Maclean 459 U.S. 375, n. 2 (1983).  Open issues included 
whether the Section authorizes private rights of action.  See, e.g., Maldonado v. 
Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998) (joining four other federal circuit courts in denying 
that Section 17(a) creates private rights of action). 
 
67 Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983) (treating as 
cumulative Section 11 under the 1933 Act and Section 10(b) under the 1934 Act).  It is 
not entirely clear whether all private rights of action under the federal securities laws are 
cumulative or whether certain express private rights of action are exclusive.  See 
generally Barbara Bader Aldave, Neither Unusual nor Unfortunate?  The Overlap of 
Rule 10b-5 with the Express Liability Provisions of the Securities Acts, 60 TEX. L. REV. 
719 (1982). 
 
68 Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387. 
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 PCAOB’s new early warning system’s greatest significance to potential auditor 
liability is for auditor failure adequately to disclose the existence and meaning of material 
weaknesses in control.  Failure to do so as Auditing Standard No. 2 directs would 
constitute departure from generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), which usually 
amounts to negligence actionable under Section 11 of the 1933 Act.   
 
 Additional liability may result because this new auditor duty to disclose is likely 
to render auditors primary rather than secondary actors when their disclosure is materially 
misstated or misleading.  If so, this strips them of protections under the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.69 That opinion held 
that, in private actions, Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act does not extend fraud liability to 
secondary actors for aiding and abetting primary violations.  
 
 The interplay is complex between these two legal standards and PCOAB’s early 
warning system.   The key pressure point is distinguishing under Auditing Standard No. 2 
between significant deficiencies—not requiring public auditor disclosure—and material 
weaknesses—requiring public auditor disclosure.  Minimizing Section 11 liability risk 
will induce auditors to treat border-line control irregularities as material weaknesses and 
provide public disclosure; minimizing Section 10(b) liability risk will induce auditors to 
treat such cases as significant deficiencies and withhold public disclosure. The Section 11 
incentive promotes Auditing Standard No. 2’s early warning system; the Section 10(b) 
incentive undermines it.  A possible device to overcome this undesirable Section 10(b) 
bias is safe harbor provisions to protect auditors from liability for forward-looking 
control statements under Section 10(b). 
  
A.  Negligent Failures in the Early Warning System under Section 11 
 
 Section 11 covers registration statements for public offerings of securities.70  It 
applies to auditors as to portions of a registration statement for which they are 
responsible, that they prepared or otherwise “expertised.”71 Under Auditing Standard No. 
                                                 
69  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 
70  Section 11(a) of the 1933 Act is a long and cumbersome provision but essentially 
provides for private rights of action by securities purchasers sold using a registration 
statement containing material misstatements or omissions on its effective date.  See 15 
U.S.C. § 77k.  For auditors, liability attaches as to financial statements in the registration 
statement when at least one of the material misstatements or omissions appears in the 
statement the auditor certified.   
 
71 Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381, n. 11 (1983).  See also id., n. 13 
(includes “accountants who are named as having prepared or certified the registration 
statement”, citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), and “only for those matters which purport to have 
been prepared or certified by them”).  Section 11 does not reach “accountants with 
respect to parts of a registration statement which they are not named as having prepared 
or certified.”  Id. at 387, n. 22. 
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2, auditors give three opinions subject to Section 11.  Section 11’s standard of care is 
good faith; its liability basis is negligence.72  For auditors, standards of performance are 
generally those fixed by GAAS.73 Auditors generally discharge their professional and 
legal obligations by complying with GAAS in good faith.74   
 
 Plaintiff-purchasers of registered securities need only show a material 
misstatement or omission to establish a prima facie case under Section 11.75 Accountants 
have the burden of demonstrating due diligence.76  Auditing Standard No. 2 does not 
change these provisions, but it radically expands auditors’ professional obligations and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
72  See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207-08: 
 
 Section 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private right 
of action for damages when a registration statement includes untrue 
statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to 
make the statements therein not misleading. . . .[E]xperts such as 
accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are 
accorded a ‘due diligence’ defense.  In effect, this is a negligence 
standard.  An expert may avoid civil liability with respect to the portions 
of the registration statement for which he was responsible by showing that 
‘after reasonable investigation’ he had ‘reasonable ground[s]’ to believe 
that the statements for which he was responsible were true and there was 
no omission of a material fact. 
 
See also Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1983) (Section 11 is 
designed to assure compliance using “a stringent standard of liability” on those playing 
direct roles in registered offerings, including accountants). 
 
73 See SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting alternative 
standard of “whether the accountant performed . . . audit functions in a manner that 
would have revealed to an ordinary prudent investor, who examined the accountant’s 
audits or other financial statements, a reasonably accurate reflection of the financial risks 
such an investor presently bears or might bear in the future [by investing] in the audited 
endeavor”). 
 
74 See SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 
75  Id. 
 
76   Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)). The classic case comprehensively outlining the due 
diligence defense generally and as applied to external auditors is Escott v. Barchris 
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (notably announcing that auditors 
“should not be held to a standard higher than that recognized in their profession”). 
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therefore legal duties concerning what due diligence requires. Auditing Standard No. 2 
and Section 11 together create pressure to disclose.77 
 
 The common scenario Auditing Standard No. 2 expressly addresses involves 
disclosure of material weaknesses and their effects on substantive audits tests concerning 
financial statement assertions.  Traditionally, auditors had no duty to disclose such 
weaknesses or to disclose their effects on substantive audit testing.  Courts deemed 
control irregularities not material.  Auditing Standard No. 2 clearly reverses these 
conclusions, imposing duties on auditors to disclose and explain both material 
weaknesses and their effect on the overall audit process, rendering both material. 
 
 This common scenario is epitomized by Monroe v. Hughes,78 a bondholder class 
action against external auditors of a defunct issuer of securities alleging violations of 
Section 11.79  The auditor furnished an unqualified financial statement audit opinion with 
respect to the issuer’s 1987 and 1988 financial statements and furnished a comfort letter 
with respect to the six-month period immediately prior to the offering.   
 
 In its 1988 audit, the auditor found internal control irregularities and conferred 
with management about them.  In light of these control irregularities, the auditor 
                                                 
77  Despite Section 11’s appeal to GAAS as the standard of an auditor’s performance, 
there is no bright-line test for determining whether an auditor meets its burden of 
establishing the due diligence defense.  At best, a judicial sliding scale evaluates 
discharge according to factors such as the defendant’s “knowledge, expertise, status with 
regard to the issuer . . . and the degree of the defendant’s actual participation in the 
registration process and in preparing the registration materials.”  Auditing Standard No. 2 
provides specific requirements and general factors that will be relevant to courts, and the 
SEC, in case-by-case evaluations of auditor reasonableness under Section 11.  See 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 2002), § 7.4[3], at 
366.  SEC Rule 176 provides similar guidance, identifying various factors relevant to the 
inquiry.  17 C.F.R. § 230.176 (listing the following as relevant circumstances in 
determining whether a person’s conduct constituted a reasonable investigation or a 
reasonable ground for belief for meeting the Section 11(c) burden: type of issuer, 
security, person, other relationships, and the reasonableness of any reliance on others).  
SEC Rule 176 has had a limited effect on judicial opinions applying Section 11.  See 
DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT (2003), at 285. 
 
78  31 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1994).  Monroe v. Hughes exemplifies a class of such cases.  E.g., 
In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 524 (S.D. Ohio 2000); 
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F. 2d 422, 432 (6th Cir. 1980); In re Worlds 
of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 
79 The opinion centers on Section 11 claims against the auditor, though plaintiffs also 
made claims against the issuer’s officers, claims under state blue sky laws, and Section 
10(b) claims against the auditor.   
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expanded the scope of its 1988 audit by performing more elaborate substantive testing.80  
In its 1989 audit, the auditor found significant deterioration in the internal control and 
was unable to issue an unqualified financial statement opinion for that fiscal year. The 
issuer collapsed later that year. 
 
The bondholders’ Section 11 claim contended that the auditor should have 
disclosed in its 1988 audit opinion the internal control irregularities it discovered.  The 
court laid out the Section 11 due diligence defense and the negligence standard governing 
auditors’ liability, observing that good faith compliance with GAAS discharges an 
auditor’s professional obligation to act with reasonable care.81 
 
The court noted that the auditor determined the irregularities it discovered to be 
significant deficiencies but not material weaknesses.82  At the time, at least, no legal or 
accounting authority required auditors to disclose those in audit reports.  Instead, auditors 
were to report them to management and, if deemed necessary, expand the scope of the 
financial audit.83  In the case, the auditor did both of these things.  Even if the control 
problems had been material weaknesses rather than merely significant deficiencies, the 
court said that the auditor would only have been required to inform management, as the 
auditor did.  For these reasons, the court concluded that there was no basis or reason to 
treat control irregularities as material under Section 11. 
 
Auditing Standard No. 2 changes this result for material weaknesses.  In effect, 
the case shows what the U.S. financial reporting system lacked: it boasted no early 
warning system.  In the case, auditors knew of warnings, but had no duty to disclose them 
publicly and the lack of this duty led the court to conclude that they were not material.  
Investors were stuck. Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to disclose these early 
warnings, giving investors aid.  Auditor failure to disclose them will constitute a 
departure from GAAS, the related information will be material, and auditors will be 
exposed to Section 11 liability.84  
                                                 
80  Before Auditing Standard No. 2, this was the auditor’s key purpose in testing control—
a selective testing to determine requisite financial statement audit scope.  After Auditing 
Standard No. 2, the control audit still provides this function but also provides 
independent information that must be publicly disclosed.  
 
81 Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, ___ (noting also relevance of good faith compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles). 
 
82  Under auditing standards in effect at the time, the irregularities were called “reportable 
conditions,” which the court described as significant deficiencies rather than material 
weaknesses.  
 
83  AICPA auditing standards adopted at the time but not yet effective also required 
auditors to report significant deficiencies to the company’s board audit committee.  Id.  
 
84 The Monroe v. Hughes plaintiffs also argued before the lower court that the auditor 
should have included in its letter either a qualification as to the scope of its audit or a 
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Consider three other variations on the common scenario epitomized by Monroe v. 
Hughes.  First, note that in traditional financial statement auditing, the consequence of a 
material weakness in control is for auditors to expand substantive audit testing.  In the 
past, allegations concerning auditor failure to follow GAAS relating to control 
deficiencies and weaknesses required plaintiffs to focus on whether auditors 
appropriately expanded the scope of substantive audit testing.85  If auditors did, the 
plaintiffs’ claim failed.  Under Auditing Standard No. 2, that is only one obligation 
auditors have.  When facing material weaknesses, at least, auditors must disclose them 
and their effect on financial-statement audit planning. 
 
 Second, consider the effect of control testing and effectiveness on the financial 
statement audit. Traditionally, plaintiffs asserting control failure needed to show a 
connection between control weaknesses and the financial statement audit.86  No longer.  
                                                                                                                                                 
statement that the issuer might not be able to continue as a going concern. The lower 
court rejected these claims, and the appellate court observed that professional standards 
would not require an auditor to include either qualification solely on the grounds that it 
had discovered reportable conditions (or material weaknesses) in internal control over 
financial reporting. 
 
85 See Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In 
Adam, the complaint satisfied particularity-pleading requirements when alleging that 
auditors made misrepresentations as to "faulty management practices, such as weak 
internal controls" and alleged how this violated specific accounting standards as to 
specific non-performing loans the auditor failed to disclose or, at minimum, which the 
auditor should have investigated further.  The Adam court rejected the auditor’s argument 
that allegations concerning a company’s weak internal controls are not actionable given 
that auditors have no independent duty to disclose findings regarding weak internal 
controls.  In Adam, the claim was not that the auditor should have disclosed those 
deficiencies, but that it knew or recklessly disregarded that, as a result of control 
deficiencies, the company’s financial statements (here loan loss reserves) were materially 
misstated and that the auditor did not expand the scope of its audit. 
 
86 See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc. Sec. Litig., 131 F. Sup. 2d 680 (E.D. Pa. 2001). 
(scienter may not credibly be inferred from auditor’s reliance on defective internal 
controls).  Accepting that the company’s internal accounting controls may have been 
unreliable, the IKON court found that no evidence indicated a connection between control 
deficiencies and the financial statement audit. The auditor examined control 
effectiveness, recommended various control improvements to management, and while the 
overall internal control environment was effective, the firm did not rely on testing of 
controls as the primary support for its financial statement audit opinion.  Accordingly, the 
IKON court granted the auditor’s motion for summary judgment due to the absence of “a 
genuine issue of material fact from which a jury could conclude that [the auditor] 
knowingly or blindly adhered to faulty internal controls or accounting practices.” (citing 
Danis v. USN Comm. Inc., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1995 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“without more, 
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Auditing Standard No. 2 defines the exercises as interrelated.87  When control is 
ineffective, auditors must so disclose and expand their testing.  Failure to do either, 
whether or not there is a provable connection between the financial statement audit and 
internal control, exposes auditors to liability for negligent departures from GAAS under 
Section 11. 
 
 Third, suppose an auditor fails to report significant deficiencies to a company’s 
management or audit committee.  This has been seen as legally irrelevant to auditor 
liability under Section 11 in the past.88  Given the central role of such communications in 
the new early warning system, however, it is possible that this failure will expose auditors 
to liability under Section 11.  This is especially the case if the audit committee fails to 
respond adequately to the auditor’s communication.   
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 does not require auditors to disclose publicly significant 
deficiencies, but it specifically provides that ineffective audit committees be treated as a 
significant deficiency at minimum, and possibly as a material weakness.89  A good case 
arises that a significant deficiency plus audit committee failure to respond to an auditor’s 
communication of it together produce a material weakness.  When this is the case, 
auditors who fail to disclose in their public reports that they communicated significant 
deficiencies to audit committees and received inadequate responses may face Section 11 
liability for this failure.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
auditor's knowledge about problems in a client's operational systems could support an 
inference only of negligence, not recklessness”)). 
 
87 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ 27; see PCOAB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AUDITING 
STANDARD NO. 2, at 3. 
 
88 See In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 524 (S.D. Ohio 
2000) (treating as irrelevant claims that auditor failed to report control deficiencies to the 
company’s audit committee because the auditor had “no duty to mention in its audit 
report that it had spoken to the audit committee about such issues”).  The SmarTalk case 
also involved allegations similar to those in Monroe v. Hughes.  The court accepted the 
auditor’s argument that its failure to disclose a company’s “lack of internal controls” did 
not violate GAAS or federal securities law because auditors have no duty “to disclose [a 
company's] lack of internal controls.”  As a matter of law, the court held, “an auditor is 
under no duty to disclose in an audit report deficiencies in internal controls.” (citing 
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F. 2d 422, 432 (6th Cir. 1980) (AICPA 
imposes no requirement that audit reports disclose internal control weaknesses); In re 
Worlds of Wonder Secs. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1417 (9th Cir. 1994)).  Despite these 
findings, other allegations of misrepresentations in the audit report supported the 
SmarTalk plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation claim. 
 
89  AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶ ___. 
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The common scenario epitomized by Monroe v. Hughes and these variations on 
its theme underscore the likely focus of future litigation: differences between significant 
deficiency and material weakness.  As Monroe v. Hughes indicated, before Auditing 
Standard No. 2, the distinction mattered only for internal purposes, for auditors had no 
obligation to disclose either publicly.  Auditing Standard No. 2 specifically requires 
auditors to disclose in their reports material weaknesses, but not significant 
deficiencies.90  
 
Under Section 11, auditors unsure of whether a control irregularity is a significant 
deficiency or a material weakness will have legal incentives to err on the side of material 
weakness.  This inclination serves PCAOB’s goal of creating an early warning system 
through Auditing Standard No. 2.  Undercutting this effect and goal, however, are 
opposite incentives arising under Section 10(b), incentives to resolve uncertainties as 
significant deficiencies rather than material weaknesses to avoid disclosure. 
 
B.  Fraudulent Failures as Primary Violations under Section 10(b) 
 
In cases like Monroe v. Hughes, after dismissing the Section 11 claim that the 
auditor had not committed negligence, Section 10(b) claims for fraud were easy to 
dismiss.  Courts could note that a defendant must have a duty to disclose for a plaintiff to 
sustain a Section 10(b) claim and that auditors had no such duty.  Under Auditing 
Standard No. 2, auditors have such duties, posing significant legal consequences under 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 
 
 Section 10(b) addresses all purchases or sales of securities.91  Anyone making 
material misstatements (or omissions) on which traders rely faces liability as a primary 
violator under Section 10(b) when they have a duty of disclosure.92  The standard is anti-
                                                 
90  See AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 173(a) & 175-177 (required modifications to 
auditor reports when there is a material weakness).  Compare AUDITING STANDARD NO. 
2, ¶¶ 207-214 (required communications to management, audit committees and boards of 
directors include all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses). 
 
91 Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it “unlawful for any person . . .  (b) to use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . .  any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission 
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.”  15 U.S.C. § 78j.   SEC Rule 10(b)(5) encompasses substantially the same 
matters as Section 10, though using language drawn from Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act 
by referring to making any untrue statement of material fact or omitting to state material 
facts necessary to make statements not misleading and specifically prohibiting frauds and 
deceit using any device, scheme or artifice.   
 
92   See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
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fraud; the liability basis is scienter,93 generally meaning intent to deceive.94 As with 
Section 11, Auditing Standard No. 2 does not change these standards, but radically 
expands auditor responsibilities and therefore legal duties—and, most importantly, in 
certain circumstances probably redefines auditor status as primary rather than secondary 
actors. 
 
 After deferring in several major decisions to address whether secondary actors 
face Section 10(b) liability for aiding and abetting fraud,95 the Supreme Court rejected the 
possibility squarely in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.96 
Auditors cannot be liable in private actions under Section 10(b) when their roles are 
simply secondary actors serving as functional accomplices to fraud.97  However, the 
Court expressly stated that this does not prevent holding auditors liable as primary actors 
when the facts indicate sufficient involvement to constitute them as primary actors.98  
                                                 
93 For private actions, negligence alone does not create liability; for SEC enforcement 
proceedings, showing negligence may suffice.  See SEC v. Arthur Young 590 F.2d 785 
(9th Cir. 1979) (assuming so without deciding). 
 
94 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194, n. 12 (1976) (the statute uses the terms 
manipulative, device and contrivance). Scienter is from a Latin word mean knowingly; it 
generally relates to a state of mind seen as intentional or at least reckless as opposed to 
negligent or grossly negligent.  The Supreme Court has deferred deciding whether it 
includes recklessness.  Id.; Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n. 5 (1980); Herman & 
Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379, n. 4 (1983).  Private Section 10(b) claims are 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard, as in other civil actions, not by any 
higher standard such as clear and convincing.  Id. at 387-88 (noting also that the 
preponderance standard applies to SEC enforcement proceedings under Section 17(a) of 
the 1933 Act). 
 
95 The Supreme Court expressly deferred addressing the aiding and abetting issue in both 
Ernst & Ernst 425 U.S. 185, 191-2, n. 7 (1976)) and Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. 375, 
379, n. 5 (1983). 
 
96  511 U.S. 164 (1994). 
 
97 Central Bank’s limitation on aiding and abetting liability applies to private actions; the 
SEC has separate statutory authority to pursue this theory.  See 1934 Act, § 20(e) 
(authorizing SEC actions under Section 21(d) for injunctions and money damages against 
“any person that knowingly provides substantial assistance to another person in violation 
of a provision of the [1934 Act]”).  The Department of Justice possesses such authority 
for criminal aiding and abetting generally.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
 
98  Central Bank, 511 U.S. 164, at 191. 
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Consequently, in post-Central Bank private actions, plaintiffs alleged that auditors acted 
as primary violators of Section 10(b) not mere accomplices.99   
 
 Courts wrestled with distinguishing between primary and secondary actors.  Most 
courts considering the question applied a bright-line rule.100  The bright-line provided that 
a secondary defendant, such as an auditor, must make a false or misleading statement (or 
omission) to the public to be liable under Section 10(b).101  Absent such a statement (or 
                                                 
99  See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (4th ed. 2002), § 
12.25, at 690. 
 
100  Scholars struggled too.  E.g., Jill E. Fisch, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: 
In Search of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 
(1999); Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line 
Between Primary and Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 
(1997); Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and Judicially Implementing 
the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability Under Section 
10(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Words on High About Rule 
10b-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 (1995). 
 
101 E.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) ("a secondary 
actor cannot incur primary liability . . .  for a statement not attributed to that actor at the 
time of its dissemination"); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997);  In re 
MTC Elec. Techs. S'holder Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); In re JWP Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 
871 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Klein v. Boyd, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 90,136, 90,317 (3d 
Cir. Feb. 12, 1998) (panel holding secondary actor potentially liable as primary actor 
when creating fraudulent statements spoken by another, but circuit en banc vacated 
decision and parties subsequently settled); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 
1215, 1226, 1227 (10th Cir. 1996) (accountants not liable despite providing significant or 
substantial assistance to primary fraudsters because liability requires that they "must 
themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or should 
know will reach potential investors"); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 
(11th Cir. 2001); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884, 901 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (stating 
that, after Central Bank, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive motions for summary judgment 
by asserting that auditors “assisted in the perpetration of a fraud”); In re Kendall Square 
Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28, 28 n.1 (D. Mass. 1994) (denying liability 
for accounting firm that reviewed and approved fraudulent financial statements because 
by not actually engaging in reporting of statements, statements were not attributable to 
firm, and further stating that "[w]hile participation in the 'structuring' of transactions may 
be evidence of [auditor’s] knowledge at the time it provided its audit opinion, the 
participation in the 'structuring' does not constitute the making of a material 
misstatement.... [I]t is clear that after Central Bank, only the making of material 
misstatements (or omissions) will be actionable under Section 10(b)."); Vosgerichian v. 
Commodore Int’l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (auditor advice and guidance 
to person making fraudulent misrepresentations do not render auditor a primary actor). 
 
 31
omission), the actor was at best an aider and abettor, outside Section 10(b)’s liability 
reach.   
 
 Some courts favored a substantial-participation approach, exposing to Section 
10(b) liability auditors whose involvement was not clearly secondary but sufficiently 
substantial to render it primary.102  Under this approach, for example, auditor silence is 
not enough to prevent auditor liability as a primary actor.  Another person’s misstatement 
could be attributed to a silent auditor if the auditor significantly participated in the 
activity where the misstatement was made.103  
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2 dramatically changes this legal landscape.  Under it, 
auditors are required to speak directly in furnishing their opinions on internal control over 
financial reporting.  If they conclude that control is effective when it is not, the situation 
may be akin to that occurring when they conclude financial statements are fair and 
conform to GAAP when this is false.  In this case, they may be seen as secondary actors, 
insulated from Section 10(b) liability. 
 
 However, unlike an adverse financial statement opinion, an adverse control 
opinion requires additional auditor disclosure.  Auditors must describe material 
weaknesses, their actual or potential effects on financial statements and on related control 
objectives, and their effects on the auditor’s financial statement audit.  When this 
disclosure is false or misleading, its speaker is a primary actor under any of the various 
formulations interpreting Central Bank. They are certainly within Section 10(b)’s reach 
                                                 
102 In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(primary liability possible for “significant role” in preparing letter to the SEC); In re 
ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (primary liability when 
auditor is "intricately involved" in creating false documents); Employers Ins. of Wausau 
v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett , 871 F. Supp. 381, 389-90 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (attorneys and 
accountants); Cashman v. Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1995). 
 
103  A position arose between these extremes of the bright-line and substantial 
participation tests.  This approach imposed liability but only so long as the secondary 
actor originated the fraud as by preparing documentation constituting misrepresentations.  
Courts were split on this variation, though it famously provided the basis for claims 
against those aiding in the Enron fraud case See Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron 
Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig.), 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).  In Newby, 
the court denied an auditor’s motion to dismiss, announcing that auditors can be primary 
violators of Section 10(b) when they design transactions knowing of their propensity to 
confuse and mislead investors.  In the case, the SEC argued that primary liability attaches 
to secondary actors when they create fraudulent documents.  This is the case whether or 
not they make public statements or have public statements of other actors attributed to 
them.  See also Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 
1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998); but see Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2001) (rejecting this standard in suit against law firm, adopting instead the bright line 
approach). 
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under the substantial participation approach and likely render auditors primary actors 
under the bright-line rule favored by most courts.   
 
 To this extent, Auditing Standard No. 2 may be seen to nullify Central Bank as to 
control audits.  Of course, it only nullifies it through indirect means, by changing the 
nature of an auditor’s professional obligations, not by changing the text of Section 10(b) 
or the Supreme Court’s interpretation of it.  But the effect is equally significant for 
auditors.  The interplay between this result of Auditing Standard No. 2 and Central Bank 
raises a complexity, however, that PCAOB probably neither foresaw nor intended.  
 
If an auditor issuing an unqualified control opinion is a secondary actor insulated 
from Section 10(b) liability while an auditor issuing an adverse opinion explaining 
material weaknesses is a primary actor subject to Section 10(b) liability, then auditors 
have a clear legal incentive to prefer the former.  For control irregularities at the border, 
this will induce auditors to characterize them as significant deficiencies rather than 
control weaknesses.  But this bias undermines PCAOB’s goal to provide early warnings 
of future financial statement unreliability. It also conflicts with the opposite effect arising 
under Section 11, which induces auditors to err on the side of designating close cases as 
material weaknesses. 
 
The two effects of Section 10(b) and Section 11 cannot be counted on to offset 
each other.  The statutory Sections address different circumstances and provide different 
legal standards and procedures, though they are cumulative and both often apply to a 
particular set of facts.  Section 11 covers only registration statements, whereas Section 
10(b) covers all matters in connection with the purchase and sale of securities.104  
Moreover, for disclosure outside registered offerings, where Section 11 does not apply, 
Section 10(b) effects are not offset by the opposite Section 11 incentives.  Thus Section 
10(b)’s incentives are strong to resolve uncertain cases as significant deficiencies rather 
than material weaknesses. 
 
A fact pattern from a classic Supreme Court case, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,105 
illustrates.  For 21 years, a brokerage firm’s president sold fraudulent securities and 
converted investor funds to his own use.  The transactions were conducted outside the 
firm’s usual dealings with customers, between investors and the president.  Transactions 
did not appear in the firm’s records or reports, which auditors audited.  The firm’s 
                                                 
104  In addition, Section 11 imposes a tough standard of obligation (negligence) compared 
to Section 10(b) (fraud); and Section 11 contains numerous procedural requirements for 
plaintiffs not faced in Section 10(b). Thus compared to Section 10(b), Section 11 is a 
stringent standard of obligation but applies to a narrower class of persons and 
transactions and carries various procedural protections the statute provides, such as 
posting bonds for costs and a one-year statute of limitations.  See Ernst & Ernst v. 
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209-10 (1976). 
 
105 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
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auditors failed to discover strange internal control practices, however, including a rule 
that no one but the president could open his mail, even when he was away.   
 
 Plaintiffs alleged that if auditors had conducted a proper audit, they would have 
discovered this, and would have had to disclose it as an irregular procedure.106  The 
Supreme Court rejected these claims.  However, the facts appear to be precisely the kind 
of control irregularity Auditing Standard No. 2 directs auditors to detect and disclose if 
detected. But if the call is close whether the irregularity is a significant deficiency or a 
material weakness, Central Bank’s primary/secondary actor distinction creates incentives 
for auditors to choose the significant deficiency characterization and withhold disclosure.  
This mutes the potential power of the early warning system. 
 
 The skewed liability incentives this interplay creates will reinforce other biases 
the new early warning system contains, independent of legal rules. Auditing Standard No. 
2 contemplates that auditors evaluate the existence of material weaknesses and disclose 
them if identified.  In practice, auditors will understand the potentially severe 
consequences for issuers of the material weakness characterization.  The automatic 
adverse opinion required by Auditing Standard No. 2 in such cases risks discouraging 
auditors from elevating significant deficiencies to the material weakness level.107 
 
 This bias may lead auditors to approach the question as whether the potential for 
misstated financials is pervasive or overwhelmingly material to the financial statements 
taken as a whole.  If not, they may conclude no material weakness exists—even if under 
the more direct approach an objective audit would indicate that a material weakness 
exists.  Auditors indulging this bias risk allowing the early warning system to fail; when 
it does, and subsequent financials cannot be given unqualified opinions, however, they 
will not face Section 10(b) liability given that such opinions position them as secondary 
not primary actors.  Though Section 11 will offset this bias somewhat for registered 
offerings, some additional adjustment to relevant legal standards seems necessary to help 
promote the effectiveness of Auditing Standard No. 2 as an early warning system. 
 
C. Promoting the Ideal 
 
 The ideal early warning system will produce auditor disclosure accurately 
reflecting calibrated risk of future financial misstatements.  That is, it should point out 
                                                 
106 Id., at 191-92.  The lower court rejected the auditor’s defense that it could not be held 
liable for aiding and abetting under 10(b) on negligence claims alone.  It referenced 
Section 17a-5, requiring auditors to inquire of and provide disclosure concerning the 
brokerage firm’s “internal control system.” In this pre-Central Bank era, such failure 
exposed the auditor to liability in damages for aiding and abetting.  In the case, genuine 
issues of material fact arose as to whether the auditor’s failure to discover the mail rule 
breached the duty and whether its discovery would have prevented the fraud. 
 
107 E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68). 
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both areas where misstatements are more than remote as well as areas where they are less 
than remote.  Liability threats could help direct disclosure toward the optimal balance.  
But the conflicting incentives created by the interplay between Auditing Standard No. 2 
and legal rules governing auditor liability impair this capability.   
 
 How can legal rules be adjusted to facilitate the early warning system’s objective 
of providing meaningful content to financial statement users?  One way to address this 
issue would be to provide that auditor statements concerning control material weaknesses 
do not expose them to Section 10(b) claims as primary actors.  This likely would better 
position auditors to provide the early warnings Auditing Standard No. 2 contemplates.  
However, it would also threaten doctrinal incoherence in Section 10(b) case law, which 
applies not only to auditors but to all actors from issuers to attorneys, underwriters and 
others. 
 
 Nor would it be appropriate simply to unite liability effects under Sections 10(b) 
and 11.  The standards address different circumstances, apply different legal standards, 
and employ differing procedural directives.  If Section 10(b) risks were increased to 
match those under Section 11, moreover, excessive material weakness conclusions could 
result, producing too many warnings, which are no warnings at all.108  If Section 11 risks 
were reduced to match those under Section 10(b), this could neutralize the directive 
power of liability risks. 
 
 A more tailored doctrinal possibility is to develop safe harbor protections for 
auditor statements under Section 10(b) about control having a forward-looking nature, 
paralleling existing safe harbors for issuer statements.  Though doing so may neutralize 
some incentives that liability threats create, additional pressures on auditors from new 
auditor independence rules and new PCAOB oversight should offer sufficient 
counterbalancing effects to generate a system likely to optimize disclosure in the early 
warning system.   
 
 1.  Forward-Looking Disclosure — In traditional financial statement audits, 
auditors speak as of a moment in time about financial statements prepared as of a prior 
date and for a prior period, providing hard facts.  Some required control-audit disclosure 
is also historical or factual in this sense, including providing PCAOB’s definition of 
material weakness, stating the existence of a material weakness, and what auditors did 
about it in their substantive testing. But in describing material weaknesses as early 
warnings, disclosure becomes inherently forward-looking. The concept of material 
weakness is forward-looking, defined as risk that material misstatements will not be 
detected or prevented.  Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to describe material 
weaknesses along with their actual or potential future effects on the financial statements. 
                                                 
108  Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417 (2003) (offering 
tentative assessment of risks of prevailing inclinations towards generating increasing 
volumes of information in light of emerging empirical studies concerning investor 
psychology and behavioral finance). 
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 Consider, for example, a material weakness in control governing the creation of 
invoices—say company policy requires a supervisor to approve invoices prepared by 
shipping clerks and an audit indicates this policy is not closely followed. Auditor 
disclosure of this situation will include historical/factual information plus forward-
looking/potential information.  The former includes auditor disclosure defining the 
concept of material weakness, identifying this invoice-control weakness and explaining 
how it led the auditor to expand the scope of its substantive audit tests (in this example, 
as by contacting a larger sampling of customers to verify the existence of purchases from 
the company). 
 
 To make related disclosure meaningful, however, auditors must disclose 
information of a more forward-looking nature.  Auditors should disclose how this 
weakness increases risk of material misstatements in the company’s accounts receivable 
line item and how this has the potential to inflate sales and earnings. Auditors should also 
disclose steps being taken or that could be taken to cure this weakness, such as enhanced 
employee training, and the potential effect these have on neutralizing such risks.   
 
 In certain cases, disclosure should explain how a particular material weakness 
relates to the company’s overall control environment and overall financial reporting 
efficacy, all of which are likely to be forward-looking. In the invoice-control example, if 
this is the only control weakness detected, disclosure indicating that this weakness should 
have no effect on other financial statement line items such as inventory would be useful 
to investors.  Auditors should also be encouraged to indicate the likelihood of designated 
potential effects and to indicate that other potential effects are less likely or not likely at 
all.   
 
 The list of examples of the kind of forward-looking information thus generated is 
limitless. Disclosure granularity is necessary to enable financial statement users to 
reasonably accurately calibrate the significance of control weaknesses in a potentially 
infinite variety of contexts.  Such particularization is necessary to make the early warning 
system effective.   But since much of the requisite disclosure is inherently forward-
looking, real risks exist that the auditor’s best judgment and guidance will, with 
hindsight, be incorrect.  Absent some legal adjustments, this risk, coupled with Section 
10(b)’s incentives to treat such control irregularities as significant deficiencies and keep 
quiet, will discourage auditors from providing optimal disclosure and render the early 
warning system substantially inert. 
 
 This illustration suggests that the early warning system for control audits is akin 
to a parallel system of forward-looking disclosure that requires and/or encourages issuers 
to provide information concerning trends and uncertainties in their businesses.109  
Whereas that forward-looking disclosure system focuses on generating early views of 
                                                 
109  SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REGULATION S-K, ITEM 303, 17 C.F.R. § 
229.303; see generally Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A 
Disclosure, 25 SEC. REG. L. J. 239 (1997). 
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business substance, PCAOB’s new early warning system focuses on generating early 
views of financial reporting processes.  A key lesson from the development of the 
substantive forward-looking disclosure regime for the process early warning system is the 
need to provide incentives and protections for those making statements about the future. 
 
 In the case of issuer forward-looking disclosure, as this system evolved in the 
1980s, the SEC, Congress and courts all offered safe harbors.  These were doctrines 
insulating issuers from liability in private actions arising form forward-looking 
statements when accompanied by requisite cautionary language and other conditions 
met.110  Evidence indicates that this system has enhanced the overall quality of 
information and its interpretation.111  Similar doctrines developed for auditing’s new 
early warning system should promote achieving ideal auditor disclosure.   
 
 Existing safe harbors governing forward-looking information do not generally 
apply to auditors.112 Despite the revolution in auditing that Congress and the SEC have 
                                                 
110 The SEC does so in Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6; Congress 
did so in provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 
77z-2 (Section 27A of the 1933 Act) and 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 
Act); and courts did so using the judicially-created bespeaks caution doctrine, see, e.g., In 
re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig., 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); Rubenstein v. Collins, 
20 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993), including 
interpretations of the SEC and Congressional systems and safe harbors, e.g., See, e.g., 
Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (11th Cir. 1999). 
  
111 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (9th ed. 2003), at 6 (citing Artyom Durnev et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy 
and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, PRESENTATION AT THE AMERICAN LAW 
AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING (May 12, 2001) (examining impact of 
mandatory forward-looking disclosure in MD&A on share prices). 
 
112  For example, statutory safe harbors define forward looking statements to mean: 
 (A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income 
(including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, 
capital expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items; 
 (B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for 
future operations, including plans or objectives relating to the products or 
services of the issuer; 
 (C) a statement of future economic performance, including any 
such statement contained in a discussion and analysis of financial 
condition by the management or in the results of operations included 
pursuant to the rules and regulations of the commission; 
 (D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
statement described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C); 
 (E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, 
to the extent that the report assesses a forward-looking statement made by 
the issuer; or 
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set off, neither body created any auditor safe harbors; and PCAOB lacks authority to do 
so.113  It may be desirable for Congress or the SEC to adopt requisite protections, ex ante, 
as this would provide greater certainty to auditors and help to develop uniform disclosure 
in this new system.114 As with the development of forward-looking disclosure system, 
however, it will likely be necessary for the judiciary to participate in shaping the exact 
contours of this system. Ultimately, it may be ideal for all three sources of authority to 
participate in providing requisite boundaries, just as all three participated in developing 
safe harbor provisions and conditions in the forward-looking disclosure system.   
 
 Absent Congressional or SEC action, moreover, courts should be encouraged to 
develop such a system independently. Courts did this for issuer forward-looking 
disclosure by developing protections under the bespeaks-caution doctrine.115  This 
                                                                                                                                                 
 (F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other 
items as may be specified by rule or regulation of the commission. 
 
Securities Exchange Act, § 21E(a). 
 
113 Cf. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 ¶ 212 (“Because of the potential for misinterpretation 
of the limited degree of assurance associated with the auditor issuing a written report 
representing that no significant deficiencies were noted during an audit of internal control 
over financial reporting the auditor should not issue such representations”). 
 
114 The SEC has power to do so.  See Securities Exchange Act, § 21E(c)(4); Securities 
Act, § 27A(g)-(h).  For example, statutory safe harbors define forward looking statements 
relating to auditor control opinions might define these by piggybacking on existing 
standards quoted in note 112 above, as follows: 
 
 (A) a statement containing an opinion as to the potential effects of 
material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting relating to 
effects on projections in revenues, income (including income loss), 
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, 
dividends, capital structure, or other financial items; 
 (B) a statement of recommendations, and proposed plans and 
objectives for future improvements in internal control over financial 
reporting, including plans or objectives relating to material weaknesses; 
and 
 (C) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any 
statement described in subparagraph (A) or (B). 
 
This suggestion is for illustration only; additional refinement would likely be required.  
Partly for this reason, it is probably just as well to recognize authority to develop this 
doctrine within federal courts. 
 
115 While the SEC was the real engine of the forward-looking disclosure regime, and it 
and Congress both furnished safe harbors, ultimate interpretation and development of the 
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provided a case-by-case evaluation of whether forward looking information was 
accompanied by sufficient cautionary language to alert a reasonable investor to the 
tentative quality of the information.116 
 
 When developing safe harbors for issuer forward-looking control disclosure, a 
standardized fact pattern emerged.  Issuer forward-looking disclosure often included 
optimistic projections that were subsequently disappointed, with stock price drops 
leading to lawsuits by security-holders who purchased or held securities during the 
relevant period.117 The opposite situation sometimes arose—issuers offering gloomy 
forecasts that turned out to be wrong and produced opposite results.118   Courts ultimately 
used substantially similar tools in evaluating both types of disclosure and related claims. 
 
 In auditing’s new early warning system, most cases may involve warnings of risks 
that ultimately are not realized.  That is, auditor warnings based on material weaknesses 
signal material risks of future financial misstatements.  When the risks are subsequently 
not realized, stock price will rise, leading to lawsuits by security holders who sold during 
the relevant period. Safe harbors should certainly be provided for such statements.   
 
 More important for auditing’s new early warning system, however, are safe 
harbors for assuring statements.  A key virtue of the safe harbor protections of auditor 
early warnings would be to encourage auditors to calibrate the significance of particular 
control weaknesses.  This means describing not only the potential risks but also singling 
out issues that a particular material weakness does not implicate. This granular disclosure 
is necessary to enable financial statement users to rank material weaknesses according to 
their gravity.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
doctrine’s contours, fell to the courts using the bespeaks caution doctrine.  See generally 
Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that “Bespeak Caution,” 49 BUS. LAW. 481 (1994). 
 
116 Courts provided varying formulations of the doctrine, though generally they applied to 
both misstatements and omissions, solely to prospective information, with particularized 
cautionary language related directly to the relevant disclosure. COFFEE & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 111, at 1017-20 (summarizing cases and positions by circuit).  In general, 
however, it is a pragmatic application of basic principles of securities law, chiefly 
designed to balance generating useful but contingent information against dangers that 
issuers could hide behind bad news by cloaking it in cautionary garb.  See Rubenstein v. 
Collins, 20 F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994). Some courts even hinted at using it to protect 
from liability disclosure concerning the effectiveness of internal control.  In re Worlds of 
Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (issuer’s warning of ongoing attempts to 
improve control implicitly seen as forward-looking). 
 
117  E.g., Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 
118  An example of this in the case of issuers is Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F.2d 
703, cert. denied 479 U.S. 1065 (1987). 
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 The need for such textured disclosure to make early warnings meaningful calls for 
balancing.  While legislative or regulatory doctrines could be developed to provide 
guidance, it will likely fall to judges to adapt the bespeaks-caution doctrine for 
application to auditor early warnings.  Traditional jurisprudence concerning the relation 
between federal securities law and GAAS provides judges with necessary grounds for 
this innovation.   
 
 Federal securities case law routinely acknowledges that auditors discharge their 
legal duties by complying with professional standards articulated as GAAS.  But they 
also recognize that compliance with GAAS does not alone satisfy legal obligations;119 
more importantly, meeting legal obligations does not always depend on compliance with 
GAAS.120  Legal standards supercede auditing standards.  In the case of Auditing 
Standard No. 2 as GAAS, judges could accept its content as specifying applicable 
professional standards, but also adjust applicable legal standards as necessary to fulfill 
the overall objectives of the early warning system.  An adapted bespeaks-caution doctrine 
can promote these objectives while sustaining the doctrinal coherence of Section 10(b) 
jurisprudence. 
   
 2.  Recovering Trust — It may seem strange to offer safe harbors to a profession 
whose diminished trustworthiness prompted Auditing Standard No. 2.  But other changes 
in requirements applicable to the auditing profession may, when coupled with such safe 
harbors, operate to provide a system geared toward providing optimal auditor disclosure 
as contemplated by Auditing Standard No. 2’s early warning system.  
 
 SOX and PCAOB are motivated to provide control-transparency due, in part, to 
diminished public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting caused by financial 
reporting debacles of the late 1990s and early 2000s.   As groups, auditing-standard 
setters, managers and auditors lost public trust necessary to vest them with discretion that 
they previously enjoyed.  Congress reflected public disgust with these groups in SOX, the 
catalyst for PCAOB and its reforms.  PCAOB-mandated control transparency is a way to 
curtail the need for that discretion, by requiring deeper disclosure of the processes by 
which managers and auditors reach their conclusions in financial reports.   
 
 As for auditing standard-setters, SOX created and anointed PCAOB, the first 
attempt consciously to insulate audit standard-setting from auditor lobbying. For 
generations, establishing generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) had been the 
                                                 
119 United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 397 
U.S. 1006 (1970) (concerning GAAP); SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (concerning GAAS) (dicta). 
 
120  E.g., Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989); In re 
Carter-Wallce, Inc. Sec. Litig., 150 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Chill v. General Electric 
Co., 101 F.3d 263, 270 (2d Cir. 1996); see also In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 128 F. 
Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C. 2001); In re E. Spire Comm., Inc., Sec. Litig. 127 F. Supp. 2d 734 
(D. Md. 2001). 
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province of the AICPA.  The AICPA used various structures to exercise this authority, all 
of which were subject to rent-seeking pressures from the profession.  SOX created 
PCAOB121 as a self-regulatory organization,122 with the SEC appointing and overseeing 
its five-member board.123  Structural features are intended to strengthen PCAOB’s 
independence from the auditing profession.124   
 
 Reflecting managerial mistrust, PCAOB announced that SOX’s Section 404 
auditor attestation is intended to give shareholders and the public “an independent reason 
to rely on management’s description of the company’s internal control over financial 
reporting.”125  Reflecting mistrust of auditors, the early warning system denies that their 
final word is acceptable, at least when material weaknesses are present. Auditors must 
disclose their conclusions and explain what they mean, leaving investors to make more 
informed judgments about the reliability of the auditor’s opinion.  
 
 SOX was accompanied by rhetoric announcing its revolutionary quality; careful 
textual study indicates that the statute itself created no revolution.126  The one silver 
bullet concerned creation of PCAOB and its mandate.127  In Auditing Standard No. 2, 
PCAOB lives up to the rhetoric.128  Critics contended that PCAOB exceeded SOX’s 
                                                 
 
121   Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. 
____. 
 
122  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 107, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. 
____. 
 
123 Monitoring duties include reviewing audit procedures and policies, registering public 
accounting firms, maintaining standards concerning audit reports, and the conduct of 
oversight, disciplining and sanctioning of public accounting firms. 
 
124    Several structural differences stand out: PCAOB is a creature of statute, not grace; a 
majority of its five members must be non-CPAs and its chair cannot have practiced 
public accounting during the year before becoming chair; it is funded by public company 
shareholders, not the AICPA; and members must be full-time and serve 5-year terms 
(with a two-term limit) and are subject to removal for cause by the SEC. 
 
125  PCAOB RELEASE ACCOMPANYING AS NO. 2, at 3. 
 
126   See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light 
Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
 
127  Id. at 919 & 945-946. 
 
128 One PCAOB Board member opined that the new regime of internal control 
certification and attestation “revolutionizes” managerial and auditor attention to internal 
control.  Statement of Daniel L. Goelzer, PCAOB, on THE PROPOSED STANDARD FOR AN 
AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION 
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Oct. 7, 2003). 
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mandates in promulgating Auditing Standard No. 2 and questioned the enlarged scope of 
legal liability risk the early warning system engenders.129  
 
 PCAOB dismissed these criticisms.  It is created to set standards on an ongoing 
basis and its authorization is open-ended, not constrained by particular SOX provisions or 
SEC regulations.130  Unlike the SEC, whose power is constrained by Congressional 
legislation granting it, PCAOB articulates generally accepted auditing standards carte 
blanche, unchecked by Congressional grants of power.131 Its actions in developing 
Auditing Standard No. 2 show determination to provide firm leadership, in the public 
interest not beholden to the auditing profession. For example, it responded to the 
profession’s comments mostly by rejecting their opinions; it provides a hard-driven 
program imposing substantial duties on auditors, significantly restricting their discretion 
and compelling new disclosure directly from auditors.   
 
 These systemic forces suggest an intention to define a new control disclosure 
regime in which auditors provide direct and full disclosure unlike that they have 
historically provided concerning financial statements.  But for PCAOB’s early warning 
system under Auditing Standard No. 2 to meet its objectives likely requires legal 
adjustments.  Judicial adjustments using safe harbors for forward-looking disclosure can 
do so, backstopped by PCAOB’s ongoing enhanced auditor oversight role. 
 
 3.  Auditor Independence —   The new control audit regime addresses the tension 
between competition and independence in the auditing profession in ways calculated to 
move auditor control disclosure towards the ideal.  Competition among auditing firms has 
provided the financial reporting system with mixed results. Critics contend that zealous 
competition for clients drove auditors headlong into consulting practices, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
129 E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from Kimball (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 38) (noting also that it had written to Indiana Senators and Congressmen 
protesting and seeking help); GlaxoSmithKline (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, 
Letter No. 62); Pfizer (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 69); Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter 
No. 102); Cummins (PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 123); Caterpillar 
(PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 143); supra note 7 (providing additional 
examples). 
 
130   See, e.g., AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 ¶ ___. 
 
131  This is an important feature making it attractive to the SEC to use organizations such 
as PCAOB, as well as self-regulatory organizations like the New York Stock Exchange to 
assist the SEC’s development and enforcement of corporate governance and related 
regulations.  See Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing 
Standards, State Law and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 961, 968-69 
(2003).  The complex interplay between Auditing Standard No. 2 and legal rules under 
Sections 10(b) and 11 show the limits of this method of regulatory production. 
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compromising their independence.132  More nuanced observers contend that the move to 
consulting was a consequence, not a cause, of pressures on auditing firms arising from 
governmental policies that encouraged them to compete in markets other than traditional 
auditing.133   
  
 Whichever view is more accurate, the high-visibility audit failures that began in 
the late 1990s led the SEC to restrict this competition, shutting auditors out of most 
consulting markets.134  SOX elevated the regulatory restrictions to federal law.135  Thus, 
accompanying the control-disclosure innovation are regulations intended to reinforce 
auditor independence.  These include empowering audit committees rather than managers 
to hire, supervise and terminate auditors,136 as well as restrictions on the kinds of non-
audit services auditors can perform to assure their independence from management.137 
 
 The new model for auditors now ideally should focus not on lucrative consulting 
business, but more effective attestation services including forward-looking disclosure 
concerning material weaknesses in control.  At stake in this new regime is whether 
auditors will produce optimal or sub-optimal information. Risks include auditor biases to 
err on the side of treating control irregularities as significant deficiencies not material 
weaknesses or to provide perfunctory boilerplate disclosure. 
 
 Given Auditing Standard No. 2’s limited and somewhat ambiguous guidance,138 
auditor disclosure will develop by custom and best practices.  Auditors will consider peer 
disclosure in shaping their own.  A competition will arise.  Disclosure competition among 
auditors may lead auditors to provide disclosure better suited to the tastes of managers 
(financial statement preparers) rather than of shareholders and the public (financial 
statement users).  Whether this competition will produce superior or inferior disclosure 
                                                 
132  See e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S 
AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS (Nov. 21, 2000). 
 
133  See e.g., Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing 
(SSRN.COM, June 16, 2003). 
 
134  AMENDMENT OF RULE 2-01 OF REGULATION S-X (Reg. § 210.2-01, Qualifications of 
Accountants). 
 
135 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. 
____ (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l) see also S.E.C. Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c) 
(4)(i)-(ix). 
 
136 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. at ___ ; 15 U.S.C. 
____. 
 
137 However, not all non-audit services are restricted, and may be performed with audit 
committee pre-approval.   
 
138   See supra Part I.C.  
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depends on whether auditors remain beholden to management or are in fact independent 
of them.   
 
 Developing a regime of forward-looking disclosure protected by safe harbor 
provisions can help reorient auditor alignment more towards investors and away from 
managers.  Auditors could more readily see themselves as partners with shareholders in 
warning of control difficulties rather than adversaries aligned with management in 
seeking to keep the financial reporting process opaque.  Thus an early warning system 
using forward-looking disclosure and safe harbors can help to reinforce the new regime 
of enhanced auditor independence. This is particularly likely if developed by judges on a 
case-by-case basis that enables attending to an auditor’s relative independence from 
management in a particular case. 
 
 
III. A DIFFERENT WARNING: CONTROL WORSHIP 
 
 The early-warning system model is rational.  The system attempts to offer deeper 
transparency about control when a company’s financial statements fairly present results 
in accordance with GAAP, but at the same time it uses weak control.  The weak control 
may impair that ability in future periods.   A warning is appropriate.  
 
 Consider other possible scenarios: the financials are materially misstated, but 
control is effective; or both are uncertifiable (misstated financials and ineffective control) 
but the financials are misstated due to factors other than ineffective control; or both are 
fine but there is no link between them.   Making transparency meaningful in these 
contexts requires greater explanation than Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to 
provide.139    
 
 Auditing Standard No. 2’s conceit is that effective control will catch accidental 
mistakes and irregularities and, possibly, fraud.  Auditing Standard No. 2 correctly 
emphasizes inherent limitations of control and the contrast between reasonable assurance, 
which is possible, and absolute assurance, which is not.140  It likewise notes that the same 
limits of financial statement audits apply to control audits.141   Auditing Standard No. 2 
also rightly describes these limits as known features of the financial reporting process and 
expresses the hope that installing safeguards will “reduce, though not eliminate, the risk” 
of material financial misstatements.142   
 
                                                 
142
139   See supra note 25 (noting that when unqualified opinions are provided Auditing 
Standard No. 2 requires no special disclosure). 
 
140 AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, ¶¶ 16-18.   
 
141 Id., ¶¶ 16-18. 
 
 Id., ¶ 16.   
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 However, Auditing Standard No. 2 never mentions the case of an adverse 
financial audit opinion despite an unqualified control audit opinion.143  But control cannot 
catch aggressive judgments.  The new auditing system will convey this point when an 
auditor provides an unqualified opinion on control but an adverse or qualified opinion on 
financial statements.  When an auditor does so without explanation, however, financial 
statement users will be confused.  In effect, Auditing Standard No. 2 and its early 
warning system assume that controls are the foundation of reliable financial statements.  
 
 But consider the variety of circumstances that can lead an auditor to provide an 
unqualified opinion on control while providing an adverse or qualified opinion on 
financial statements.  These involve all matters of accounting judgment, ranging from 
allowance for doubtful accounts to off-balance sheet financing to stock option valuation.  
Any of these and scores of other accounting judgments may be aggressive.  This can be 
the case even though a company otherwise uses air-tight control over matters such as 
transaction recording, classification and aggregation. 
 
 This class of incongruent opinions can arise for innocuous reasons such as 
disagreements over accounting judgments.  A simple illustration occurs when 
managers—and auditors—thoroughly review all reporting and controls and find both to 
be air-tight.  Yet the SEC disagrees with an accounting judgment and compels the 
company to restate the financials.144  There is no control weakness or even deficiency, but 
no doubt that the financial statements were not fairly stated in conformity with GAAP. 
 
 Disagreements concerning accounting judgment can also arise between 
management and auditors.  Suppose FASB adopts a new accounting standard.  Its 
interpretation in application is untested.  Management may take one position and the 
auditor another and they cannot resolve the difference but the auditor does not feel 
constrained to resign from the engagement.  If controls are air-tight, the auditor would 
provide an unqualified opinion on control but a non-standard opinion on the financial 
statements—adverse or qualified. 
 
 At the other extreme, managerial judgments can be simply out of bounds and the 
auditor cannot concur with them.  Suppose an auditor assesses managerial judgments as 
too aggressive, whether as to reserving for doubtful accounts, assessing inventory 
                                                 
143 As matters of logic and probability, it may be more likely that a company will boast 
ineffective internal control over financial reporting and yet be in a position to present fair 
financial statements than the other way around.  But of greater concern is the situation in 
which effective control nevertheless yields materially misstated financial statements. 
 
144 See Comment Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, LLP (PCAOB Rulemaking 
Docket No. 8, Letter No.136) (commenting on Proposed Standard, ¶ 126: “There are 
often cases where a restatement of financial statements is not due to any weakness in 
internal control (e.g., cases where accounting or disclosure is responsibly reviewed at all 
levels of the company and at the highest levels of the auditing firm, but a restatement is 
still required due to the insistence of the SEC staff based upon differing judgment.”)). 
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obsolescence, depreciating fixed assets, accounting for leases, stock options, derivatives 
or any of numerous other areas demanding judgment over which control puts no limits.  
Auditors can say control is effective, but cannot concur that the financial statements fairly 
present condition and results in conformity with GAAP.145  
 
 Between the extremes of innocuous and manipulative are circumstances 
generating scope limitations on auditor reports.  Circumstances may prevent an auditor 
from concluding that financial statements warrant an unqualified opinion; but it may yet 
be able to give an unqualified opinion on control.   
 
 In many of these contexts, the incongruent opinions might signal to reasonable 
and prudent investors not merely a yellow flag of caution but a red flag concerning a 
management’s integrity in the financial reporting process.  But not all such cases will 
deserve such an interpretation. They could be explained as reasonable.   
 
 Despite these complex realities, PCAOB and its pronouncements never mention 
such situations.  On the contrary, all express ultimate confidence in control as the key to 
reliable financial reporting.  As a result, PCAOB’s new early warning system imposes no 
explanatory disclosure obligation on auditors in these situations as it does when control is 
weak but financials are reliable. This asymmetry can create undue emphasis on control 
and insufficient emphasis on matters that must be valued using judgment.   
 
 After all, everything about internal control over financial reporting should be 
geared to fairly-presented financial statements, for present and future periods, not as ends 
in themselves.  The new deepened transparency concerning control over financial 
reporting is not really what investors care about; if auditors had retained investor trust it 
would not be necessary to deepen disclosure in this way.  Investors only care about 
control because auditors violated that trust. 
  
 Absent auditor—or PCAOB—explanation of the variety of opinion combinations 
and meanings, the new system of yellow (and red) flags will include no green flags.  For 
example, in this system what is the significance of an unqualified opinion as to both 
control and financial statements?  The alignment may tend to create in the investment 
community a sense that control is working to the end of promoting fair financial 
statements.  But this sense may be false.146  Opposite congruent opinions can likewise 
                                                 
145 Cf. Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Instruments Corporation (PCAOB 
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114) (“Recent major frauds occurred at 
management level, so responding with enhanced testing of computer controls would not 
have prevented and is wrong medicine; focus should be on high-risk areas”). 
 
146 This raises a curiosity in Auditing Standard No. 2 that would remain a curiosity but 
for the planned broad disclosure regime.  Auditing Standard No. 2 provides that when 
management gives its controls an adverse opinion, and the auditor concurs, it must 
concur with management (offer an unqualified opinion on their adverse assessment).  See 
supra note 27. 
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mislead unless explained: For joint adverse opinions, the alignment may signal to 
investors and others that control weaknesses are to blame for noncompliant financial 
statements.  But this may not be the case. 
 
 Without clear explanation of these incongruities, PCAOB’s new early warning 
system is a partial step.  Failing to address these matters contradicts its premises.  It 
reflects diminished trust in auditors and enriched appetite for information concerning the 
interior of the financial reporting process.  Auditing Standard No. 2 delivers this for the 
early warning system, but then relies on opposite premises when failing to deliver for the 
bewildering variety of other combinations of opinions its new regime sponsors.   
 
 The purpose of effective control is to facilitate preparation of fairly-presented 
financial statements, current and future.  But the possibility of incongruent audit opinions 
shows that there is no necessary connection between the two.  In fact, the recognized 
possibility of incongruent opinions suggests reason to be concerned that control can 
become an end in itself rather than the means to the ultimate objective of fair financial 
reporting. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Revolutions invariably bring unintended consequences.  Second-order effects are 
especially likely for processes with multiple components driven by numerous actors 
operating separately and without coordination.  For revolution to yield coherent results, 
other components must make corresponding adjustments. The complex financial 
reporting process illustrates. In the case of PCAOB’s new early warning system, 
Congress directed its creation and provided a skeletal instruction for implementation.  
PCAOB provides an elaborate program.  Laws that interplay with this feature require 
adjustment to move the overall process towards greater coherence.  PCAOB itself also 
has more work to do, particularly providing greater clarity to aspects of its new system as 
likely to mislead and confuse investors as to provide meaningful early warnings. 
 
 
